PHDBA279A 2011

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2011 Syllabus

New papers:

• A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation by Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole.

Problem Sets:

• Problem Set 1
• Problem Set 2
• Problem Set 3

Ernesto: Papers covered in class:

• Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
• Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). pdf. Presentation in 2011 version of class: pdf.
• Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). pdf
• Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
• Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. pdf
• Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
• Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
• Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
• Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. pdf
• Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
• Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225.
• Laffont, J-J., and J.Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Chapter 11 (up to section 11.5 incl.).
• Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.
• Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.
• Demsetz (1968), Why Regulate Utilities, Journal of Law and Economics 11, 55- 56.
• Laffont, J-J., and J. Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Introductory chapter, and Chapter 1 (up to section 1.7 incl.).

Rui Papers covered in class:

• Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. pdf
• Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
• Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. pdf
• Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
• Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
• Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. pdf