Difference between revisions of "ECON207B"

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===Games played on networks===
 
===Games played on networks===
  
Presentation by Matt Leister (slides)
+
Presentation by Matt Leister ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-NetworkGames.pdf |slides]])
 
*Calvo-Armengol A., E. Patacchini and Y. Zenou (2009), “Peer E¤ects and Social Networks in Education,”Review of Economic Studies 76, 1239-1267.
 
*Calvo-Armengol A., E. Patacchini and Y. Zenou (2009), “Peer E¤ects and Social Networks in Education,”Review of Economic Studies 76, 1239-1267.
 
*Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo and Yariv (2010): Network Games, The Review of Economic Studies , 77 (1) , pp. 218244.
 
*Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo and Yariv (2010): Network Games, The Review of Economic Studies , 77 (1) , pp. 218244.
Line 30: Line 30:
 
===Strategic network formation===
 
===Strategic network formation===
  
Presentation by Michele Muller (slides)
+
Presentation by Michele Muller ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Strategic1.pdf |slides]])
 
*Jackson and Wolinsky (1996): A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory , 71 (1) , pp. 44-74.
 
*Jackson and Wolinsky (1996): A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory , 71 (1) , pp. 44-74.
 
*Christakis, N.A. and Fowler, J.H. and Imbens, G.W. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2010), "An empirical model for strategic network formation", National Bureau of Economic Research
 
*Christakis, N.A. and Fowler, J.H. and Imbens, G.W. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2010), "An empirical model for strategic network formation", National Bureau of Economic Research
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===Strategic network formation===
 
===Strategic network formation===
  
Presentation by Marco Alexander Schwarz
+
Presentation by Marco Alexander Schwarz ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Strategic2.pdf |slides]])
 
*Bala and Goyal (2000): A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, Econometrica, 68 (5) , pp. 1181–1229.
 
*Bala and Goyal (2000): A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, Econometrica, 68 (5) , pp. 1181–1229.
 
*Galeotti and Goyal (2010): The Law of the Few, American Economic Review.
 
*Galeotti and Goyal (2010): The Law of the Few, American Economic Review.
Line 42: Line 42:
 
===Statistical network formation===
 
===Statistical network formation===
  
Presentation by James
+
Presentation by James ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Stochastic.pdf |slides]])
 
*Jackson and Rogers (2007): Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Socially Generated Networks?, American Economic Review 97, pp. 890-915.
 
*Jackson and Rogers (2007): Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Socially Generated Networks?, American Economic Review 97, pp. 890-915.
 
*Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009): An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica , 77 (4) , pp. 10031045.
 
*Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009): An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica , 77 (4) , pp. 10031045.
Line 48: Line 48:
 
===Information aggregation in networks===
 
===Information aggregation in networks===
  
Presentation by Junjie Zhou
+
Presentation by Junjie Zhou ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-InfoAggregation.pdf |slides]])
 
*DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003): Persuasion Bias, Social Influence and Unidimensional Opinions, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 118, pp. 909-968.
 
*DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003): Persuasion Bias, Social Influence and Unidimensional Opinions, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 118, pp. 909-968.
 
*Golub and Jackson (2010): Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and the Wisdom of Crowds, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
 
*Golub and Jackson (2010): Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and the Wisdom of Crowds, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Line 54: Line 54:
 
===Networks and labor markets===
 
===Networks and labor markets===
  
Presentation by Attila Lindner  
+
Presentation by Attila Lindner ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-LaborMarkets.pdf |slides]])
 
*Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004): The E¤ects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality, American Economic Review , 94 (3) , pp. 426-454
 
*Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004): The E¤ects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality, American Economic Review , 94 (3) , pp. 426-454
 
*Topa (2001): Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies , 68 (2) , pp. 261-295
 
*Topa (2001): Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies , 68 (2) , pp. 261-295
Line 61: Line 61:
 
===Favoritism and political connections===
 
===Favoritism and political connections===
  
Presentation by Alisa Tazhitdinova
+
Presentation by Alisa Tazhitdinova ([[Media:ECON207B-SlidesFavoritism.pdf |slides]])
 
*Bramoulle, Y. and S. Goyal (2010), “Favoritism,”Working paper, Laval University and Cambridge.
 
*Bramoulle, Y. and S. Goyal (2010), “Favoritism,”Working paper, Laval University and Cambridge.
 
*Khwaja, A., and A. Mian (2005). “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.
 
*Khwaja, A., and A. Mian (2005). “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.
  
 
===Financial networks===
 
===Financial networks===
Presentation by Tarso Mori Madeira
+
Presentation by Tarso Mori Madeira ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Financial1.pdf |slides]])
 
*Allen, Franklin and Gale, DouglasM. [2000] “Financial Contagion,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1.
 
*Allen, Franklin and Gale, DouglasM. [2000] “Financial Contagion,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1.
 
*Allen, Franklin, Ana Babus and Elena Carletti [2010] “Financial Connections and Systemic Risk,”Working paper, UPenn, Cambridge, EUI.
 
*Allen, Franklin, Ana Babus and Elena Carletti [2010] “Financial Connections and Systemic Risk,”Working paper, UPenn, Cambridge, EUI.
Line 72: Line 72:
 
===Financial networks===  
 
===Financial networks===  
  
Presentation by Vladimir  
+
Presentation by Vladimir ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Financial2.pdf |slides]])*Caballero, Ricardo, and Alp Simsek [2010] “Complexity and Financial Panics,”working paper, MIT and Harvard.
*Caballero, Ricardo, and Alp Simsek [2010] “Complexity and Financial Panics,”working paper, MIT and Harvard.
 

Revision as of 17:58, 23 October 2011

ECON207B was taught by Adam Szeidl and Shachar Kariv in the Spring of 2010. I auditted this class.

Course Website

The course website was [1].

Course Materials

There was a useful syllabus.

Lecture slides:

Student Presentations

All slides posted here are (C) copyright their respective authors. Please contact the authors before using them in any fashion.

Games played on networks

Presentation by Matt Leister (slides)

  • Calvo-Armengol A., E. Patacchini and Y. Zenou (2009), “Peer E¤ects and Social Networks in Education,”Review of Economic Studies 76, 1239-1267.
  • Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo and Yariv (2010): Network Games, The Review of Economic Studies , 77 (1) , pp. 218244.

Strategic network formation

Presentation by Michele Muller (slides)

  • Jackson and Wolinsky (1996): A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory , 71 (1) , pp. 44-74.
  • Christakis, N.A. and Fowler, J.H. and Imbens, G.W. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2010), "An empirical model for strategic network formation", National Bureau of Economic Research

Strategic network formation

Presentation by Marco Alexander Schwarz (slides)

  • Bala and Goyal (2000): A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, Econometrica, 68 (5) , pp. 1181–1229.
  • Galeotti and Goyal (2010): The Law of the Few, American Economic Review.

Statistical network formation

Presentation by James (slides)

  • Jackson and Rogers (2007): Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Socially Generated Networks?, American Economic Review 97, pp. 890-915.
  • Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009): An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica , 77 (4) , pp. 10031045.

Information aggregation in networks

Presentation by Junjie Zhou (slides)

  • DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003): Persuasion Bias, Social Influence and Unidimensional Opinions, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 118, pp. 909-968.
  • Golub and Jackson (2010): Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and the Wisdom of Crowds, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

Networks and labor markets

Presentation by Attila Lindner (slides)

  • Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004): The E¤ects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality, American Economic Review , 94 (3) , pp. 426-454
  • Topa (2001): Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies , 68 (2) , pp. 261-295
  • Munshi (2003): Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the US Labor Market, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, pp. 549-599.

Favoritism and political connections

Presentation by Alisa Tazhitdinova (slides)

  • Bramoulle, Y. and S. Goyal (2010), “Favoritism,”Working paper, Laval University and Cambridge.
  • Khwaja, A., and A. Mian (2005). “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.

Financial networks

Presentation by Tarso Mori Madeira (slides)

  • Allen, Franklin and Gale, DouglasM. [2000] “Financial Contagion,”Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1.
  • Allen, Franklin, Ana Babus and Elena Carletti [2010] “Financial Connections and Systemic Risk,”Working paper, UPenn, Cambridge, EUI.

Financial networks

Presentation by Vladimir (slides)*Caballero, Ricardo, and Alp Simsek [2010] “Complexity and Financial Panics,”working paper, MIT and Harvard.