Difference between revisions of "BPP Field Exam Papers 2012"
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− | #[[Romer Rosenthal]] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf] | + | #[[Romer Rosenthal]] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf] |
#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9]) | #[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9]) | ||
#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6]) | #[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6]) |
Revision as of 03:17, 14 May 2012
- This page is in the BPP category
- This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
Insert the following code at the head of each page in this section: *This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]
NOTE: This is for 2012. For 2011, see BPP Field Exam Papers For 2010, see 2010 BPP Field Exam Papers.
Polictical Science
Dal Bo
- Romer Rosenthal pdf
- Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf (Slides #9)
- Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf (Slides #6)
- Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf (Slides #8)
- Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf (Slides #6)
- Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf (Slides #4)
- Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf (Slides #7)
- Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf (Slides #9)
- Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf (Slides #7)
- Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf (Slides #2)
- Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf (Slides #6)
Slide Sets referenced are:
- Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Slides #2)
- Externalities in voting games (Slides #4)
- The efficiency of democracy (Slides #6)
- Competition and influence (Slides #7)
- Corruption deterrence (Slides #8)
- The electoral control of politicians (Slides #9)
Innovation (Mowery)
See also: BPP Innovation
- S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc
- P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.
- Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
- Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
- Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
- Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
- Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
- Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
- Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
- Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf