BPP Field Exam Papers

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NOTE: This is for 2011. For 2010, see 2010 BPP Field Exam Papers.

Innovation (Mowery)

See also: BPP Innovation

1. S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc
2. P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.
3. Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
4. Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
5. Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
6. Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
7. Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
8. Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
9. Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
10. Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf

Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)

Dal Bo

1. Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. pdf (Class Slides)
2. Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. pdf
3. Salop (1979), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. pdf
4. Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. pdf

Tadelis

See notes on Steve's innovation section here.

1. Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
2. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
3. Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572
4. Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. pdf
5. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf
6. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf
7. Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf
8. Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf
9. Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
10. Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,” NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])

de Figueiredo

1. Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series", Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. pdf
2. Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. pdf
3. Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. pdf
4. Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000), "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. pdf
5. Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity. Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403.
6. Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q", Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. pdf
7. Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount", Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. pdf
8. Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. pdf
9. Teece, D. (1982), "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. pdf

Institutions

See also: ECON224

Tadelis

See Notes from Steve's institution section here.

• Holmström, Bengt (1979) "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics 10(1): 74-91.
• Gibbons, Robert (1998) "Incentives in Organizations" The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4):115-132.
• Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63
• Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz, 1972, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec., 1972), pp. 777-795. Available in JSTOR.
• Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics

13(2):324-340

• Coase, Ronald 1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, Available in JSTOR
• Williamson, Oliver, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct., 1979), pp. 233-261. Availabe in JSTOR.
• Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978) Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,h Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326.
• Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart (1986). fThe Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719.
• Barzel, Yoram (1982) fMeasurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, Journal of Law and Economics, 25(1):27-48
• Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001) "Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts." RAND Journal of Economics 32(2):387-407.
• Tadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) fTransaction-Cost Economics, to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press
• Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1998) The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4):73-9
• Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857.
• MacLeod, W. Bentley (2003), "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review 93(1):216-40.
• Hayek, F. A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35(4):
• Garicano, Luis (2000) "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904.
• Antràs, Pol, Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006) "Outsourcing in a Knowledge Economy." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):31-77.

Yuchtman

• North & Weingast (1989)
• Naidu (2010)
• Grief (1993)
• Clark (1985)
• La Porta et al (2008)
• Hansmann (1988)
• Bubb (2009)
• Levin and Tadelis (2005)

For the Papers below, see summaries here.

• Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
• Manning (2003)
• Lazear (2000)
• Bandiera et al (2007)

Polictical Science

Dal Bo

1. Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf (Slides #9)
2. Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf (Slides #6)
3. Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf (Slides #8)
4. Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf (Slides #6)
5. Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf (Slides #4)
6. Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf (Slides #7)
7. Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf (Slides #9)
8. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf (Slides #7)
9. Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf (Slides #2)
10. Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf (Slides #6)

Slide Sets referenced are:

• Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Slides #2)
• Externalities in voting games (Slides #4)
• The efficiency of democracy (Slides #6)
• Competition and influence (Slides #7)
• Corruption deterrence (Slides #8)
• The electoral control of politicians (Slides #9)

de Figueiredo

See also: BPP Political Science

1. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
2. Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf (Class Handout and Class Slides)
3. Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
4. Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
5. Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
6. de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
7. de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
8. Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
9. Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
10. Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
11. Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, available on his website pdf (Class Slides: Set1 Set2, © Adrienne Hosek)

Auctions and Contracts

See PHDBA279B.

Morgan

1. Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. link pdf
2. Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. link pdf
3. Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003), "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. link pdf
4. Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf
5. Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf
6. Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press pdf
7. Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. link pdf
8. Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, link pdf
9. Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. link pdf

The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:

• Introduction
• Auctions
• Adverse Selection
• Contests
• Costless Signalling

Tadelis

1. Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000), "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. pdf
2. Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 pdf
3. Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009), "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. pdf
4. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf
5. Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 pdf
6. Holmstrom B., (1999), "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 pdf
7. Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through Google Books)
8. Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008), "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. pdf
9. Tadelis, S. (2001), "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 pdf
10. Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf