Difference between revisions of "Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2005)"
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*X is other covarriate | *X is other covarriate | ||
*PAT is potential for Atlantic Trade | *PAT is potential for Atlantic Trade | ||
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| + | Reults of Specification 1: | ||
| + | * when Interation term added, WE covariate becomes small and non-significant. Demenstrating that the interation is what is important. | ||
| + | *Run cols 8-10 with Atlantic costline instead of Atlantic Trader, as we are concerned with Atlantic trader being an expost outcome and endogenous. | ||
| + | *Interation only becomes significant after dates 1600 when using AT dummuy, and 1750 when using Atlantic costline instead of expost AT result. | ||
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| + | Secification 2 repeats specification 1 using a more restricted model, as we force differential growth to be related to log of aggregate volume of atlantic trade in time t and country j instead of simply being an Atlantic trader. Results are nearly identical to Specification 1. | ||
=== What do the authors tests achieve?=== | === What do the authors tests achieve?=== | ||
Revision as of 14:09, 15 May 2012
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
Contents
- 1 Empirical Questions:
- 1.1 What is the author's topic and hypothesis?
- 1.2 How does the author test the hypothesis?
- 1.3 What do the authors tests achieve?
- 1.4 How could the tests be improved on? Strengths? Weaknesses?
- 1.5 What are some alternative empirical strategies
- 1.6 How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?
Empirical Questions:
What is the author's topic and hypothesis?
The author attempts to show that Atlantic trade contributed to European growth through an indirect instutional channel as well as via its more obvious direct effects.
- Atlantic trade generated large profits for comercial interests in favor of institutional changes in countries that met two crucial criteria:
- easy access to the Atlantic
- Nonabsolutisit initial insitutions
These profits swung the balence of power away from the monarchy and induced significant reforms in political institutions, which paved the way for more secure property rights.
How does the author test the hypothesis?
The authors test the the idea that WE growth after 1500 was primarily due to growth in countries involved with Atlantic trading or with high potential for Atlantic trading.
Specification 1 (results in table 2) [math]u_{jt} = d_{t} + \delta_{j} + \sum\limits_{t\gt =1600} \alpha_{t} \cdot WE_{j} \cdot d_{t} + \sum\limits_{t\gt =1500} \beta_{t} \cdot PAT_{j} \cdot d_{t}+X_{jt} \cdot \gamma +\epsilon_{jt}[/math]
- [math]u_{jt}[/math] is urbanization in country j at time t
- WE is dummy for Western Europe
- d is the year effects
- [math]\delta_{j}[/math] is country effects
- X is other covarriate
- PAT is potential for Atlantic Trade
Reults of Specification 1:
- when Interation term added, WE covariate becomes small and non-significant. Demenstrating that the interation is what is important.
- Run cols 8-10 with Atlantic costline instead of Atlantic Trader, as we are concerned with Atlantic trader being an expost outcome and endogenous.
- Interation only becomes significant after dates 1600 when using AT dummuy, and 1750 when using Atlantic costline instead of expost AT result.
Secification 2 repeats specification 1 using a more restricted model, as we force differential growth to be related to log of aggregate volume of atlantic trade in time t and country j instead of simply being an Atlantic trader. Results are nearly identical to Specification 1.
