PTLR Codification

Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review

The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules

This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them. See below:

Core Terms

Saturated Invention Spaces = (SIS)

As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)
 
Example of:  
imperfect competition - (IC)
Look for:
cluster - (CLSTR)
coherent groups - (CoGs)
adjacent - (Adj)

Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)

1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  

Example of:
coordination - (COOR)
Look for:
diversely-held - (DH)
complementary inputs - (CI)
dispersed - (DIS)
fragmented - (Frag)
Cournot problem - (CP)
multiple marginalization - (MM)

Overlapping Patents - (OP)

Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.
Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.

Example of:
Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'
Look for:
patent overlap - (PO)
overlapping claims - (OC)
similar claims - (SC)
simultaneous infringement - (SI)

Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)

Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.

Example of:
Moral Hazard - (MH)
Look for:
spurious patents - (SP)
dubious
bad
likely invalid
junk
impeding genuine innovators
rent-seeking
bad faith

Modern Terms

Transaction Costs - (TC)

All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.

Look for:
prosecution costs
perverse incentive
bargaining costs
coordinating costs
maintenance fees
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
Coasian

Probabilistic Patents - (PP)

Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  

Look for:
Bessen
Lemley & Shapiro
information asymmetry
uncertainty
invalid patents
infringement
invent around

Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)

Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.

Look for:
Kiley
ever-greening
Jacob
submarine patents
viagra
expected returns
commercialization opportunities
spurious patents
gaming the patent system
patent portfolios
stand-alone commercial value

Search Costs - (SC)

All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.

Look for:
Wang
Coasian'
perverse incentives
willful infringement

Patent Hold-up - (PH)

The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.

Look for:
Epstein
Farrell
Williamson's
rents
royalties
reverse hold-up
guile
FRAND
SEP
Langus

Strategic Patents - (SP)

Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.

Look for
patent portfolio
Hall & Ziedonis

Hold-out - (HO)

Can occur in situations of DHCI when a "hold-out" player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.
*Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.

Look for:
guile
FRAND
SEP
Farrell
patent hold-up
reverse patent hold-up
DHCI

Types

Theory - (T)

Empirical - (E)

Discussion - (D)

Topics

Effects on Academia - (EA)

Look for:
overlapping patents
DHCI
cumulative innovation
basic science

Private Mechanism - (PM)

Look for:
cross-licensing
patent pools
patent clearinghouses
patent collectives
FRAND
patent intermediaries
NPEs
technology standards
standard setting organizations

Industry Commentary - (IC)

Look for:
nanotech industry
genetics industry
basic science
upstream patents
nanobiotech
synthetic biology

IPR Reform - (IPR)

Look for:
property rights
USPTO
transaction costs
propertization
IP rights
patent pools
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act

Firm Strategy - (FS)

Look for:
pre-emptive patents
willful infringement
ever-greening
secrecy
blocking patents
Mexican standoffs

Individual Items

Code for:
cross-licensing
patent pools
patent clearinghouses
patent collectives
FRAND / RAND
patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)
NPEs Non-Participating Entities
technology standards
SSOs (standard setting organizations)
patent trolls
submarine patents
SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)
ever-greening
blocking
cites: Shapiro (2001), "Navigating the patent thicket"
cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), "Anti-commons something..."
cites: Heller (1997?), "Something..."

Publication Type

Econ - (ECON)
Law - (LAW)
Science - (SCI)
Policy Report - (POLR)

Authors

What are the number of authors? (0-9)
How many authors are repeat authors?