Difference between revisions of "Overconfidence Papers"
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| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
year={2005}, | year={2005}, | ||
publisher={Wiley Online Library} | publisher={Wiley Online Library} | ||
| + | abstract={We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.} | ||
} | } | ||
Revision as of 11:11, 29 July 2016
Papers
Malmendier & Tate 2005
@article{malmendier2005ceo,
title={CEO overconfidence and corporate investment},
author={Malmendier, Ulrike and Tate, Geoffrey},
journal={The journal of finance},
volume={60},
number={6},
pages={2661--2700},
year={2005},
publisher={Wiley Online Library}
abstract={We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company-specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms.}
}
