Difference between revisions of "Hornbeck (2010)"
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The effect on Investment from a change in cost of protection equals the change in Investment from a change in protection multiplied by the change in protection from a change in cost of protection. | The effect on Investment from a change in cost of protection equals the change in Investment from a change in protection multiplied by the change in protection from a change in cost of protection. | ||
| − | Since <math>\frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}} < 0</math> we know that an estimate of \frac{\partial I}{\partial C_{p}} is informative about the sign of \frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}} | + | Since <math>\frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}} < 0</math> we know that an estimate of <math>\frac{\partial I}{\partial C_{p}}</math> is informative about the sign of <math>\frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}}</math> |
=== How does the author test the hypothesis? === | === How does the author test the hypothesis? === | ||
Revision as of 23:45, 15 May 2012
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
Contents
- 1 Empirical Questions:
- 1.1 What is the author's topic and hypothesis?
- 1.2 How does the author test the hypothesis?
- 1.3 What do the authors tests achieve?
- 1.4 How could the tests be improved on? Strengths? Weaknesses?
- 1.5 What are some alternative empirical strategies
- 1.6 How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?
Empirical Questions:
What is the author's topic and hypothesis?
This paper examines the impact on agricultural development from a decrease in the cost of protecting farmland. Barbed wire appears to have had a substantial impact on agriculture development in the US and in particular, this may reflect an important role for protecting land and securing farmers' full bundle of property rights.
Theoretical Framework: [math]\frac{\partial I}{\partial C_{p}}=\frac{\partial I}{\partial P} \cdot \frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}}[/math]
The effect on Investment from a change in cost of protection equals the change in Investment from a change in protection multiplied by the change in protection from a change in cost of protection.
Since [math]\frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}} \lt 0[/math] we know that an estimate of [math]\frac{\partial I}{\partial C_{p}}[/math] is informative about the sign of [math]\frac{\partial P}{\partial C_{p}}[/math]
