Difference between revisions of "Untangling the Economics of Patent Thickets"
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==Definitions== | ==Definitions== | ||
| − | + | A) '''Saturated Invention Spaces:''' The earliest definition of a patent thicket that we found is in Teece (1998), who points out a simple issue with patents. We refer to this as ‘saturated invention spaces’ and describe it as when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15) | |
| + | * Coordination: patent holders determine licensing rates independently | ||
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| + | B) '''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs (DHCI):''' 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro, pg.17) | ||
| + | * Coordination: patent holders determine licensing rates independently | ||
| + | |||
| + | C) '''Overlapping Patents:''' | ||
| + | #The second most common foundation for a patent thicket issue relies on overlapping patents. Patent overlaps can be horizontal (i.e. though patents that are largely adjacent to one another) or vertical (i.e. when patents are related through cumulative innovation). Horizontal overlaps arise because patent rights are imperfectly defined property rights. (p.20) | ||
| + | #Refinement patents and research tool patents could result in vertically overlapping patent rights (or at least contractual rights). (p.21) | ||
| + | * Imperfectly defined property rights: wasteful duplication of licensing expenditure | ||
| + | |||
| + | D) '''Gaming the Patent System:''' There are information asymmetries between a patent applicant and the patent office and a patent applicant may take some inappropriate action, for example by applying for a patent that is not novel or is obvious. Such an inappropriate action can impose costs on the patent office and may generate negative externalities, imposing costs on genuine innovators. We refer to this situation as ‘gaming the patent system’. (p.21) | ||
| + | *Imperfect competition: a small number of firms hold all possible patent rights in an area | ||
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===Relative Definition Quotes=== | ===Relative Definition Quotes=== | ||
Revision as of 14:48, 19 June 2017
| Academic Paper | |
|---|---|
| Title | Patent Thicket Literature Review |
| Author | Ed Egan, David Teece |
| Status | Working paper |
| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Contents
The Paper
Latest version is:
\coauthoredprojects\Egan and Teece\McN-PatentThicket-Egan-092215.pdf
This file is posted at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/untangling-patent-thicket-literature
Definitions
A) Saturated Invention Spaces: The earliest definition of a patent thicket that we found is in Teece (1998), who points out a simple issue with patents. We refer to this as ‘saturated invention spaces’ and describe it as when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)
- Coordination: patent holders determine licensing rates independently
B) Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs (DHCI): 1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro, pg.17)
- Coordination: patent holders determine licensing rates independently
C) Overlapping Patents:
- The second most common foundation for a patent thicket issue relies on overlapping patents. Patent overlaps can be horizontal (i.e. though patents that are largely adjacent to one another) or vertical (i.e. when patents are related through cumulative innovation). Horizontal overlaps arise because patent rights are imperfectly defined property rights. (p.20)
- Refinement patents and research tool patents could result in vertically overlapping patent rights (or at least contractual rights). (p.21)
- Imperfectly defined property rights: wasteful duplication of licensing expenditure
D) Gaming the Patent System: There are information asymmetries between a patent applicant and the patent office and a patent applicant may take some inappropriate action, for example by applying for a patent that is not novel or is obvious. Such an inappropriate action can impose costs on the patent office and may generate negative externalities, imposing costs on genuine innovators. We refer to this situation as ‘gaming the patent system’. (p.21)
- Imperfect competition: a small number of firms hold all possible patent rights in an area
Relative Definition Quotes
Shapiro: "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology" (p.3-4)
Kiley: "Those operating at the beginnings of the road are most insistent on their right to nail down leverage that will remain formidable despite market place rejection of the uses to which they say their inventions may be put. The frank aim of these early stage workers is to control ultimate applications discovered by others." (p. 8)
Current List of Papers
Processed papers
Files
- Current directory containing candidate papers
- Processed BibTeX master file
Maybe Important Files
- PTLRCore.bib - Might contain core BibTeX entries
- PTLRDefinitions.pdf - useful to contrast conflicting definitions
- PTLRBibliography.bib - Long list of citations
- PTLR-HoldupQuotes.txt - List of complete quotes with citations
- PTLR-PolicyRpts.txt - Short list of policy reports ranging from 2002 - 2013
- PTLRUp.bib - Another bibliography, additions or subtractions unknown
.PL files
- BibTucker.pl - location PTLRv2 & 3 folders
- PTLRBibTeXReprocessing.pl - location PTLRv2 & 3 folders
- temp.pl - location PTLRv2 folder
- BibTuckerV20.pl - PTLRv3 folder
- PLTROldTables.txt
