Difference between revisions of "Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble"
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imported>Moshe (New page: Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012] ===Model=== *Firm has to request operational permit from official *Official asks bribe, b, from firm *Firm pays bribe if b<v, if not reports offi...) |
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+ | {{Article | ||
+ | |Has page=Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble | ||
+ | |Has bibtex key= | ||
+ | |Has article title=Corruption as a Gamble | ||
+ | |Has author=Cadot, O. | ||
+ | |Has year=1987 | ||
+ | |In journal= | ||
+ | |In volume= | ||
+ | |In number= | ||
+ | |Has pages= | ||
+ | |Has publisher= | ||
+ | }} | ||
Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]] | Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]] | ||
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*infinite period game | *infinite period game | ||
− | === | + | ===Comparative Statics=== |
*If wages raised optimal bribe requested is smaller, but because its smaller, it is paid more often | *If wages raised optimal bribe requested is smaller, but because its smaller, it is paid more often | ||
*So paying higher wages in public sector could lead to more but petty corruption | *So paying higher wages in public sector could lead to more but petty corruption | ||
*When discount factor is bigger the size of the bribe is smaller, because official cares more about the future. | *When discount factor is bigger the size of the bribe is smaller, because official cares more about the future. |
Latest revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
Article | |
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Has bibtex key | |
Has article title | Corruption as a Gamble |
Has author | Cadot, O. |
Has year | 1987 |
In journal | |
In volume | |
In number | |
Has pages | |
Has publisher | |
© edegan.com, 2016 |
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]
Model
- Firm has to request operational permit from official
- Official asks bribe, b, from firm
- Firm pays bribe if b<v, if not reports official who is fired
- infinite period game
Comparative Statics
- If wages raised optimal bribe requested is smaller, but because its smaller, it is paid more often
- So paying higher wages in public sector could lead to more but petty corruption
- When discount factor is bigger the size of the bribe is smaller, because official cares more about the future.