Difference between revisions of "Innovation Policy"

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=Acts with pages=
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The following acts have their own pages:
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*114, Ways & Means Committee, [[Innovation Promotion Act]]. See also https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2605
 +
*114, H.R.9 [[Innovation Act]]. See also [[H.R. 9: Innovation Act]]
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*114, S.1137 [[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act]]
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*114, H.R.2045 [[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act]]
 +
*114, S.632 [[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act]]
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*114, H.R.1896 [[Demand Letter Transparency Act]]
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*114, H.R.1832 [[Innovation Protection Act]]
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*112, H.R.1249 [[America Invents Act]]
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*112, S. 1138 [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]
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*113, S. 627 and 115, S. 295 [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]
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*113, H.R.845 [[The Shield Act]]
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*113, S. 2146 [[Patent Fee Integrity Act]]
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*114, S.1137 [[PATENT Act]]
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*114, S.632 [[STRONG Patents Act]]
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*114, [[S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016]]
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 +
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{| {{table}}
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Bill'''
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Congress'''
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Sponsor'''
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Committee'''
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Reports'''
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Last Action'''
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|-
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| [[Innovation Promotion Act|H.R.2605 - Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Rep. Schwartz, Allyson Y. [D-PA-13] (Introduced 06/28/2013)||House - Ways and Means||||06/28/2013 Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
 +
|-
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| [[H.R. 9: Innovation Act|H.R.9 - Innovation Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Goodlatte, Bob [R-VA-6] (Introduced 02/05/2015)||House - Judiciary||H. Rept. 114-235||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
 +
|-
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| [[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act|S.1137 - PATENT Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
 +
|-
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| [[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act|H.R.2045 - Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Burgess, Michael C. [R-TX-26] (Introduced 04/28/2015)||House - Energy and Commerce||H. Rept. 114-877||12/16/2016 Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 688.
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|-
 +
| [[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act|S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
 +
|-
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| [[Demand Letter Transparency Act|H.R.1896 - Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Polis, Jared [D-CO-2] (Introduced 04/20/2015)||House - Judiciary||||05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.
 +
|-
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| [[Innovation Protection Act|H.R.1832 - Innovation Protection Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Rep. Conyers, John, Jr. [D-MI-13] (Introduced 04/16/2015)||House - Judiciary||||05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.
 +
|-
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| [[America Invents Act|H.R.1249 - Leahy-Smith America Invents Act]]||112th Congress (2011-2012)||Rep. Smith, Lamar [R-TX-21] (Introduced 03/30/2011)||House - Judiciary; Budget||H. Rept. 112-98||09/16/2011 Became Public Law No: 112-29. (TXT | PDF)
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|-
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| [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act|S.1138 - Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]||112th Congress (2011-2012)||Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 05/26/2011)||Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions||||05/15/2012 Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee on Primary Health and Aging. Hearings held. With printed Hearing: S.Hrg. 112-570.
 +
|-
 +
| [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act|S.495 - Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]||115th Congress (2017-2018) | Get alerts||Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 03/02/2017)||Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions||||03/02/2017 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
 +
|-
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| [[The Shield Act|H.R.845 - Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Rep. DeFazio, Peter A. [D-OR-4] (Introduced 02/27/2013)||House - Judiciary||||04/08/2013 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, And The Internet.
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|-
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| [[Patent Fee Integrity Act|S.2146 - Patent Fee Integrity Act]]||113th Congress (2013-2014)||Sen. Feinstein, Dianne [D-CA] (Introduced 03/13/2014)||Senate - Judiciary||||03/13/2014 Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
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|-
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| [[PATENT Act|S.1137 - PATENT Act]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
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|-
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| [[STRONG Patents Act|S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015)||Senate - Judiciary||||02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
 +
|-
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| [[S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016|S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016]]||114th Congress (2015-2016)||Sen. Hatch, Orrin G. [R-UT] (Introduced 07/29/2015)||Senate - Judiciary | House - Judiciary||S. Rept. 114-220; H. Rept. 114-529||05/11/2016 Became Public Law No: 114-153. (TXT | PDF)
 +
|-
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
=United States Patent and Trademark Office=
 
=United States Patent and Trademark Office=
The [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] (USPTO) is the organization within the United States government that reviews and grants patents and trademarks. Established under the Department of Commerce on July 19, 1952[https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/patent-and-trademark-office] by 35 U.S.C. §1[http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2013-title35/html/USCODE-2013-title35-partI-chap1-sec1.htm], the USPTO is intended to fulfill the mandate in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_States_of_America_1992]. Since 1790, the USPTO has issued more than 6.5 million patents[http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-web-database-now-includes-all-patents-dating-1790]. The agency's main offices reside in Alexandria, Virginia, with several satellite offices around the country.
 
  
=Current Issues Facing the Patent System=
+
{{#section:United_States_Patent_and_Trademark_Office|USPTO}}
The number of patent applications sent to the USPTO has continued to increase over the years. Although innovation has not slowed, critics of the patent system are abundant and demand stricter reform. The USPTO
+
{{#section:United_States_Patent_and_Trademark_Office|USPTO2}}
  
 +
==Patent Pools==
  
*Many patents are approved because [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] examiners don’t have time or resources to search all the relevant references
+
Patent pools are agreements between patent owners to share, or cross-license, their own patents with one another.[http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Generally, patent pools cover mature and complex technologies that require complementary patents to develop compatible products and services. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Complementary patents are patents that are must be used together for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)].
**The current patent backlog, as of January 2016, is 561,585. [http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (USPTO)]
 
**Total Pendency, time between patent filing and patent action, is 26.1 months, as of January 2016. [http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 (USPTO)]
 
***Total Pendency goal time is 20 months by FY2019. [http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 (USPTO)]
 
* “The past three decades of wanton patent-granting have created a disastrous environment for innovation. Today it’s practically impossible to build anything without violating a patent of some kind—and risking a multimillion-dollar lawsuit for your troubles.” [http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/ (Wired)]
 
*Technology industry has too many overly broad patents, leading to incredibly silly patent litigation cases
 
**Amazon “owns” the process that allows people to buy things with a single click.
 
**Apple now claims the exclusive right to sell rounded-edged, rectangular-shaped communication devices on which icons are arranged in a grid with a row of persistent icons at the bottom
 
**A small company in Tyler, Texas, once demanded more than $600 million from Google because of the design of the borders around its display ads.
 
*‘’’Patent Trolls’’’ are nonpracticing entities that don’t make products but exist solely on the revenue of its patents
 
**Costs a few thousand dollars to secure a patent, which can bring in millions through litigation
 
**It is usually more expensive to win a case against a troll than to just settle
 
*Last year, for the first time, spending by Apple and Google on patent lawsuits and unusually big-dollar patent purchases exceeded spending on research and development of new products, according to public filings. [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html?_r=0 (NYT-PW)]
 
*Me-too drugs: a drug that is approved after a pioneering drug and is the 'same'; it is not clinically superior to the original drug [http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf (WHO)]
 
  
==Patent Pools==
+
Opponents criticize patent pools for the potential of anti-competitive behavior and collusion, primarily with regards to substitute patents. Substitute or non-essential patents cover competing technologies that can be developed in parallel without risk of infringement [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf]. Certain patent pools have been found to share competitively sensitive information such as marketing and pricing strategies and R&D findings.[http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf] The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission stated that patent pools may create barriers to entry for new firms since the required patents will be inaccessible [http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf (DOJ)]
  
Patent pools are agreements between "two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties." [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]  Generally, patent pools cover mature and complex technologies that require complementary patents to develop compatible products and services. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. More recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken steps to standardize patent pools in order to prevent violations of antitrust laws. The DOJ finds patent pools with the following characteristics permissible:
+
In order to address the concerns raised against patent pools, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken steps to standardize patent pools in order to prevent violations of antitrust laws. The DOJ requires the following characteristics for a patent pool:  
  
 
# Essential patents included only.  
 
# Essential patents included only.  
Line 32: Line 80:
 
# Pricing in downstream production cannot be affected by or discussed by members of the patent pool. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf].  
 
# Pricing in downstream production cannot be affected by or discussed by members of the patent pool. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf].  
  
===Benefits===
+
These restrictions allow for patentees and standard setting organizations to maximize the benefits of creating patent pools. The creation of patent pools mainly benefits the owners of complementary and essential patents. Essential patents are patents required for a product or process to meet a given sector's technical standards. Cross-licensing between companies in a patent pool facilitates building upon previous technologies and increases the efficiency of innovation by organizing complementary intellectual property assets under one contract  [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Mutually blocking patents often slow technological developments as neither party can make use of its technology without infringing on the other party's patent. By forming a patent pool, both parties can develop substitute technologies without risk of infringement. Companies can also reduce the amount spent on litigation by settling disputes with the creation of patent pools.  This would benefit small- and medium-sized businesses that usually cannot afford the costs of expensive litigation. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Transaction costs as well as royalties can also be lowered in a patent pool.
 
 
'''Efficiency''': The creation of patent pools mainly benefits the owners of complementary or essential patents. Complementary patents cover multiple technologies protected by separate patents required for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Cross-licensing between companies in a patent pool facilitates building upon previous technologies and increases the efficiency of innovation by organizing complementary intellectual property assets under one contract  [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Mutually blocking patents often slow technological developments as neither party can make use of its technology without infringing on the other party's patent. By forming a patent pool, both parties can develop substitute technologies.  
 
 
 
'''Cost Reduction''': Companies can also reduce the amount spent on litigation by settling disputes with the creation of patent pools.  This would benefit small- and medium-sized businesses that usually cannot afford the costs of expensive litigation. [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] Transaction costs as well as royalties can also be lowered in a patent pool.
 
 
 
===Risks===
 
 
 
'''Elimination of Competition''': Opponents criticize patent pools for the potential of anti-competitive behavior and collusion, primarily with regards to substitute patents. Substitute patents cover competing technologies that can be developed in parallel without risk of infringement [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf]. Patent pools formed between entities holding substitute patents eliminate competition in that particular technological sector, reinforcing the parallels drawn between patent pools and cartels [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)]. Patent pools potentially create a way for companies to share competitively sensitive information, such as pricing, marketing strategies, or R&D information among its members." [http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (WIPO)] For example, R&D information and developments could be shared in grant-back provisions, a requirement that companies share new or downstream technologies and innovations with members of the pool without additional fees.
 
 
 
'''Licensing Practices''': If a patent pool restricts its members from licensing its patents independently, it lowers the incentive to produce alternatives and inflates the costs of goods or technology for consumers.  The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission state that restrictions on licensing may create "a barrier to entry if existing relationships make it harder for 'new firms to come in and overcome the patent thicket'." [http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf (DOJ)]
 
 
 
'''Pricing''': Given agreements between patent holders to reduce royalties, there may be collusion to fix higher prices for consumers. Technology may become inaccessible to a large number of consumers, hurting the overall public good.
 
  
 
==Patent Trolls==
 
==Patent Trolls==
Patent Trolls are an innovation bogeymen, with numerous research articles and legislation addressing ways to curb troll activity. Patent Trolls, also known as [[Patent Assertion Entities]] (PAEs), generate revenue through suing or threatening to sue businesses that infringe on patents. Experts dispute terms for such corporations, labeling them as either [[Patent Assertion Entities]] (PAEs) or [[Non-Practicing Entities]] (NPEs). There is no widely agreed upon definition of 'Patent Troll', because it is often used interchangeably with the terms [[Patent Assertion Entities]] and [[Non-Practicing Entities]], whereas we make a distinction between these three terms. For our study, we define Patent Trolls as a 'person or entity that attempts to enforce patent rights against supposed infringement far beyond the patent's actual value'[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll]. Their asked damages are far beyond the market value of the patent. This is a tactic used to scare small businesses in the initial demand letter, when pressing them to pay the fee to license the patent.
 
 
The current patent system in the United States is facing a fair amount criticism on multiple fronts. Skeptics have argued that the current system is broken as it allows the presence of patent trolls, though metrics regarding the prevalence of patent trolls are unclear. Several important pieces of legislation have been proposed to combat these reported patent trolls, as well as a "Prize System for Invention", which rewards innovative companies with monetary prizes instead of patents.
 
 
'''Hypothesis: Patent trolls will generally push for settlements and jury trials.'''
 
 
In all of the cases eDekka filed in 2015, each one asked for trial by jury.
 
However, another company that is considered a big patent troll, Oberalis does not file for trial by jury.
 
 
In cases that involve educational institutions (PAEs/NPEs but not patent trolls), the educational institution doesn't ask for a jury trial. In fact, the company being sued responds to the complaint with a jury demand. Some examples of this:
 
*Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Apple Inc
 
*Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co
 
*The Regents of the University of California v. Micro Therapeutics Inc. et al
 
*Cambridge University Press et al v. Patton et al
 
 
==Prize System for Inventions==
 
 
The current patent system allows companies to file for the right to exclude if they have a novel, non-obvious invention. The right to exclude creates a temporary monopoly for a certain product, which leads to higher product costs for the consumer. One example of a patent leading to exorbitantly high prices would be Daraprim, a drug produced by Turing Pharmaceuticals. Martin Shkreli, the CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, led the charge to increase the price of Daraprim from $13.50 to $750 per pill. [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34331761 (BBC)]
 
 
Critics of the current patent system also believe it does not incentivize enough research and development for drugs that benefit society as a whole. [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-28/news/31877151_1_drug-prices-intellectual-property-innovation (Economic Times)]
 
 
Because of such abuses of patent protections, economists and legislators have advocated for a prize system (see [[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]) instead of a patent system for pharmaceutical drugs. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/radical-bill-seeks-to-reduce-cost-of-aids-drugs-by-awarding-prizes-instead-of-patents/2012/05/19/gIQAEGfabU_story.html (Washington Post)] Under this system, companies that invent a new drug will receive a lump sum prize. The rights to the drug will then be placed in the public domain, creating generic drugs. The biggest benefit of a prize system is the ability to target research towards a specific problem. With prize money as the incentive, research companies are more likely to devote time and resources towards the identified issue. In addition, the prize system lowers barriers to entry; nontraditional parties are encouraged to participate.
 
 
Although the prize system idea sounds promising for individuals requiring medication without high reservation price, the issue of sustained government funding for such endeavors hurts this proposal. Private investors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, offer similar prize systems for pharmaceuticals discoveries. However, if private investment has proven to be effective, why does the government need to intervene?
 
 
Legislators have proposed bills that provide for prize systems for a small class of drugs (see [[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]).
 
 
Prize systems could take many different forms:
 
# Opt-in systems where the government pays at least the monopoly profits that the patent holder would expect to receive
 
# System where patents are exchanged for compensation through an auction
 
# Offer cash subsidy to consumers who value the patented product more than the marginal cost but cannot afford the patented product at a monopoly price
 
 
===Problems & Considerations Surrounding the Prize System===
 
 
No one knows the economic effects of prize systems; there is lack of empirical evidence supporting the benefits of a prize system over a patent system. There are several factors that need to be considered in creating a prize system [http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/scitech/volume131/documents/wei_web.pdf (BU)]:
 
 
'''Valuation Problems'''
 
What is the criteria for awarding a prize and how much prize money is each innovative drug worth? This is one of the biggest problems in establishing a prize system. Prize payments that are too low won’t provide enough incentive, while payments that are too high may incur resource duplication costs. The prize payment amount also has to be individually tailored to the benefit of the drug. People suggest the value of the payment be dependent on the ‘social value’ of a drug, but how is that social value determined? Will a distinction be made between medically necessary drug inventions and lifestyle improvement drugs (e.g. acne medication)?
 
 
'''Timing of Prize Payments'''
 
The timing of the prize payment has to be timed well; if awarded too early other companies may not be incentivized to produce a drug that would’ve been higher quality than the drug that won the prize. After the prize is awarded, incentive to commercialize the drug is reduced since there is no patent system. One potential solution is to defer prize payment until there has been a certain degree of commercialization.
 
  
'''Administrative Problems'''
+
{{#section:The Truth Behind Patent Trolls|trolls}}
The MIPF creates a board of trustees that has the responsibility of awarding prize payments. Though the board of 13 members is designed to be unbiased, it is unlikely that they will not be subject to political and external pressures, leading to a distorted allocation of resources.  
+
Currently, there is no systematic data that proves the existence of patent trolls and that quantifies their financial effects on companies.
  
A negative aspect of the patent system is the controversy and dispute that follows patent distribution of benefits. We can expect that there will also be challengers regarding the recipient of prize payments, thus the prize system has to specify how to resolve disputes, and also develop a thorough screening mechanism to confirm the reported benefits of the invented drug.
+
=[[America Invents Act]]=
 +
{{#section:Leahy_Smith_America_Invents_Act|aia}}
  
=Patent Reform=
+
=Proposed Patent Reform=
  
==Reasons for Patent Reform==
+
<section begin=Patent_Reform />
 +
'''[[Innovation Act]]''':{{#section:Innovation_Act| summary}}
 +
'''[[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act]]''':{{#section:Protecting_American_Talent_and_Entrepreneurship_(PATENT)_Act| PatentAct}}
 +
<section end=Patent_Reform />
  
*Many patents are approved because [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]] examiners don’t have time or resources to search all the relevant references
+
===Bills Relevant to Innovation===
**The current patent backlog, as of January 2016, is 561,585. [http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (USPTO)]
 
**Total Pendency, time between patent filing and patent action, is 26.1 months, as of January 2016. [http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 (USPTO)]
 
***Total Pendency goal time is 20 months by FY2019. [http://www.uspto.gov/corda/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1004 (USPTO)]
 
* “The past three decades of wanton patent-granting have created a disastrous environment for innovation. Today it’s practically impossible to build anything without violating a patent of some kind—and risking a multimillion-dollar lawsuit for your troubles.” [http://www.wired.com/2012/11/ff-steven-levy-the-patent-problem/ (Wired)]
 
*Technology industry has too many overly broad patents, leading to incredibly silly patent litigation cases
 
**Amazon “owns” the process that allows people to buy things with a single click.
 
**Apple now claims the exclusive right to sell rounded-edged, rectangular-shaped communication devices on which icons are arranged in a grid with a row of persistent icons at the bottom
 
**A small company in Tyler, Texas, once demanded more than $600 million from Google because of the design of the borders around its display ads.
 
*‘’’Patent Trolls’’’ are nonpracticing entities that don’t make products but exist solely on the revenue of its patents
 
**Costs a few thousand dollars to secure a patent, which can bring in millions through litigation
 
**It is usually more expensive to win a case against a troll than to just settle
 
*Last year, for the first time, spending by Apple and Google on patent lawsuits and unusually big-dollar patent purchases exceeded spending on research and development of new products, according to public filings. [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html?_r=0 (NYT-PW)]
 
*Me-too drugs: a drug that is approved after a pioneering drug and is the 'same'; it is not clinically superior to the original drug [http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf (WHO)]
 
  
==Proposed Legislation==
+
Below is a table containing brief overviews of the bills pertaining to innovation that have been passed or introduced by the 114th Congress.
  
*[[Innovation Act]]
+
{| class="wikitable"
*[[Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act|PATENT Act]]
+
|-
*[[Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act|TROL Act]]
+
! Bill
*[[Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth (STRONG) Patents Act|STRONG Patents Act]]
+
! Prognosis
*[[Demand Letter Transparency Act]]
+
! Sponsor
*[[Innovation Protection Act]]
+
!Full Title
 +
!Date Introduced
 +
!Status
 +
|-
 +
|[[S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1890]
 +
|Enacted
 +
|Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
 +
|A bill to amend chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, to provide Federal jurisdiction for the theft of trade secrets, and for other purposes.
 +
|JUL 29, 2015
 +
|Enacted — Signed by the President on May 11, 2016
 +
|-
 +
|[[H.R. 9: Innovation Act]]  [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9]
 +
|36%
 +
| Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia)
 +
| To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes.
 +
|Feb 5, 2015
 +
|Reported by Committee on Jun 11, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[S. 1137: PATENT Act]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1137]
 +
|36%
 +
| Charles “Chuck” Grassley (D-Iowa)
 +
|A bill to amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes.
 +
|Apr 29, 2015
 +
|Reported by Committee on Jun 4, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[H.R. 2045: Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2045]
 +
|24%
 +
| Michael Burgess (R-Texas)
 +
|To provide that certain bad faith communications in connection with the assertion of a United States patent are unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and for other purposes.
 +
|Apr 28, 2015
 +
|Reported by Committee on Apr 29, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[H.R. 1832: Innovation Protection Act]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1832]
 +
|5%
 +
| John Conyers Jr. (D-Michigan)
 +
|To provide for the permanent funding of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and for other purposes.
 +
|Apr 16, 2015
 +
|Referred to Committee on Apr 16, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[S. 632: STRONG Patents Act of 2015]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s632]
 +
|4%
 +
| Chris Coons (D-Delaware)
 +
|A bill to strengthen the position of the United States as the world's leading innovator by amending title 35, United States Code, to protect the property rights of the inventors that grow the country's economy.
 +
|Mar 3, 2015
 +
|Referred to Committee on Mar 3, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[S. 926: Grace Period Restoration Act of 2015]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s926]
 +
|4%
 +
| Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin)
 +
|A bill to amend the patent law to promote basic research, to stimulate publication of scientific documents, to encourage collaboration in scientific endeavors, to improve the transfer of technology to the private sector, and for other purposes.
 +
|Apr 14, 2015
 +
|Referred to Committee on Apr 14, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[H.R. 2370: End Anonymous Patents Act]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2370]
 +
|0%
 +
| Theodore Deutch (D-Florida)
 +
|To amend title 35, United States Code, to require disclosure of ownership and transfers of ownership of patents, and for other purposes.
 +
|May 15, 2015
 +
|Referred to Committee on May 15, 2015
 +
|-
 +
|[[H.R. 1896: Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015]] [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1896]
 +
|0%
 +
| Jared Polis (D-Colorado)
 +
|To amend chapter 26 of title 35, United States Code, to require the disclosure of information related to patent ownership, and for other purposes.
 +
|Apr 20, 2015
 +
|Referred to Committee on Apr 20, 2015
 +
|}
  
==Future Legislation==
+
== Market of Ideas ==
*[[Innovation Promotion Act]]
+
<section begin=Market_of_Ideas />
 +
[[Market of Ideas Research Notes]]
  
==Previously Considered Patent Reform==
+
=References=
 +
<references>
  
*[[Leahy Smith America Invents Act]]
+
<ref name="GovTrack"> [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr9#] 'H.R. 9: Innovation Act', govtrack.us. </ref>
*[[Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act]]
+
<ref name="innovationactsummary"> [https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/782015_InnovationAct3.pdf] 'The Innovation Act', ''Judiciary Committee: Chairman Bob Goodlatte'', (Washington, D.C.). </ref>
*[[Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act]]
+
<ref name="PAsummary"> [https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Patents,%2004-29-15,%20PATENT%20Act%20-%20One%20Pager.pdf] 'The Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT) Act: Short Summary', "Senate Committee on the Judiciary" (Washington, D.C). </ref>
*[[The Shield Act]]
+
<ref name="patentactgovtrack"> [https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1137] 'S.1137: PATENT Act', 'govtrack.us'. </ref>
*[[Patent Fee Integrity Act]]
+
<ref name="USPTO report"> [http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY15PAR.pdf] 'United States Patent and Trademark Office Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2015', "United States Patent and Trademark Office", (Alexandria, Virginia). </ref>
 +
[[Category: Internal]]
 +
[[Category:Innovation Policy]]

Latest revision as of 11:56, 24 March 2017

Acts with pages

The following acts have their own pages:


Bill Congress Sponsor Committee Reports Last Action
H.R.2605 - Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013 113th Congress (2013-2014) Rep. Schwartz, Allyson Y. [D-PA-13] (Introduced 06/28/2013) House - Ways and Means 06/28/2013 Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R.9 - Innovation Act 114th Congress (2015-2016) Rep. Goodlatte, Bob [R-VA-6] (Introduced 02/05/2015) House - Judiciary H. Rept. 114-235 02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
S.1137 - PATENT Act 114th Congress (2015-2016) Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015) Senate - Judiciary 02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
H.R.2045 - Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015 114th Congress (2015-2016) Rep. Burgess, Michael C. [R-TX-26] (Introduced 04/28/2015) House - Energy and Commerce H. Rept. 114-877 12/16/2016 Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 688.
S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015 114th Congress (2015-2016) Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015) Senate - Judiciary 02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
H.R.1896 - Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015 114th Congress (2015-2016) Rep. Polis, Jared [D-CO-2] (Introduced 04/20/2015) House - Judiciary 05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.
H.R.1832 - Innovation Protection Act 114th Congress (2015-2016) Rep. Conyers, John, Jr. [D-MI-13] (Introduced 04/16/2015) House - Judiciary 05/15/2015 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet.
H.R.1249 - Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 112th Congress (2011-2012) Rep. Smith, Lamar [R-TX-21] (Introduced 03/30/2011) House - Judiciary; Budget H. Rept. 112-98 PDF)
S.1138 - Prize Fund for HIV/AIDS Act 112th Congress (2011-2012) Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 05/26/2011) Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 05/15/2012 Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Subcommittee on Primary Health and Aging. Hearings held. With printed Hearing: S.Hrg. 112-570.
S.495 - Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act Get alerts Sen. Sanders, Bernard [I-VT] (Introduced 03/02/2017) Senate - Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 03/02/2017 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
H.R.845 - Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013 113th Congress (2013-2014) Rep. DeFazio, Peter A. [D-OR-4] (Introduced 02/27/2013) House - Judiciary 04/08/2013 Referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, And The Internet.
S.2146 - Patent Fee Integrity Act 113th Congress (2013-2014) Sen. Feinstein, Dianne [D-CA] (Introduced 03/13/2014) Senate - Judiciary 03/13/2014 Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
S.1137 - PATENT Act 114th Congress (2015-2016) Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA] (Introduced 04/29/2015) Senate - Judiciary 02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
S.632 - STRONG Patents Act of 2015 114th Congress (2015-2016) Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE] (Introduced 03/03/2015) Senate - Judiciary 02/25/2016 Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. Hearings held.
S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 114th Congress (2015-2016) Sen. Hatch, Orrin G. [R-UT] (Introduced 07/29/2015) House - Judiciary S. Rept. 114-220; H. Rept. 114-529 PDF)

United States Patent and Trademark Office

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the organization within the United States government that reviews and grants patents and trademarks. The USPTO is tasked with defining patent types and what each type covers and protects. Established under the Department of Commerce on July 19, 1952[1] by 35 U.S.C. §1[2], the USPTO is intended to fulfill the mandate in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."[3]. Since 1790, the US has issued more than 6.5 million patents[4]. The agency's main offices reside in Alexandria, Virginia, with several satellite offices around the country.

In April 2016, the USPTO had an unexamined patent backlog of 549,896 and 352,573 application filings for review. The unexamined patent backlog is a record of how many UPR Patents are waiting for review by a patent examiner, and application filings are how many patents are being sent in for review. [5] The USPTO reports that in 2016 the average total pendency time, the time between filing a patent application and issuing or dismissing a patent, has been 26 months. The USPTO stated in its Performance and Accountability Report for 2015 that it struggles to find and to maintain sustainable funding. The report shows that the funding is necessary to improve on both patent and trademark quality and timeliness. [1]


Patent Pools

Patent pools are agreements between patent owners to share, or cross-license, their own patents with one another.(WIPO) Generally, patent pools cover mature and complex technologies that require complementary patents to develop compatible products and services. (WIPO). Complementary patents are patents that are must be used together for the development of a specific new product, and therefore, necessitate shared licensing (WIPO).

Opponents criticize patent pools for the potential of anti-competitive behavior and collusion, primarily with regards to substitute patents. Substitute or non-essential patents cover competing technologies that can be developed in parallel without risk of infringement [6]. Certain patent pools have been found to share competitively sensitive information such as marketing and pricing strategies and R&D findings.[7] The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission stated that patent pools may create barriers to entry for new firms since the required patents will be inaccessible (DOJ)

In order to address the concerns raised against patent pools, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken steps to standardize patent pools in order to prevent violations of antitrust laws. The DOJ requires the following characteristics for a patent pool:

  1. Essential patents included only.
  2. Complementary patents included only.
  3. Sensitive information may not be shared amongst parties.
  4. Substitute products may still be developed by parties included in the licensing agreement.
  5. Patent pool has an established expiration date.
  6. Pricing in downstream production cannot be affected by or discussed by members of the patent pool. [8].

These restrictions allow for patentees and standard setting organizations to maximize the benefits of creating patent pools. The creation of patent pools mainly benefits the owners of complementary and essential patents. Essential patents are patents required for a product or process to meet a given sector's technical standards. Cross-licensing between companies in a patent pool facilitates building upon previous technologies and increases the efficiency of innovation by organizing complementary intellectual property assets under one contract (WIPO). Mutually blocking patents often slow technological developments as neither party can make use of its technology without infringing on the other party's patent. By forming a patent pool, both parties can develop substitute technologies without risk of infringement. Companies can also reduce the amount spent on litigation by settling disputes with the creation of patent pools. This would benefit small- and medium-sized businesses that usually cannot afford the costs of expensive litigation. (WIPO) Transaction costs as well as royalties can also be lowered in a patent pool.

Patent Trolls

No agreed-upon definition of patent troll exists. The term patent troll is used interchangeably with the terms non-practicing entities (NPEs) and patent assertion entities (PAEs). Despite similar sounding names, several key differences exist between the three terms.

Non-practicing entities (NPEs) own patents, but do not necessarily create products out of these patents. This behavior is common; 95% of patents are never used commercially [9]. Universities are examples of non-practicing entities. Faculty members may file for patents based on their work in a laboratory and receive a patent. Then, those faculty move on to a different project and do not use the patent they hold.

Patent assertion entities (PAEs) are a type of non-practicing entity that generate a majority of their revenue through licensing patents they own. For example, a large firm may buy up a thousand patents. Instead of creating products derived from those patents, they license these patents to other firms that wish to create those products. If another firm infringes on a patent, the patent-assertion entity may send a demand letter to the company with a warning. The demand letter warns the infringer that they are subject to a lawsuit if they do not acquire proper licensing of a patent.

These demand letters serve as the tipping point between patent assertion entities and patent trolls. Whereas PAEs assert the fair value of their patent against the infringer, patent trolls inflate the amount of damages felt as a result of infringement. Patent trolls may threaten a firm with exorbitant lawsuit costs, and then provide a quick way out of a lawsuit through a license. The supposed infringer, fearful of a high lawsuit costs, may just pay the licensing fee. However, the supposed infringer may not even have infringed on any patent.

Patent trolls may also target a slew of companies that tangentially intersect the sphere of the patent. One famous example of a patent troll is MPHJ Technology Investment, who claimed to have patents that cover any networked "scan-to-email" function. MPHJ sent demand letters to more than 16,000 small businesses, each letter demanding license fees of at least $1000 per worker.

Currently, there is no systematic data that proves the existence of patent trolls and that quantifies their financial effects on companies.

America Invents Act

The H.R.1249: Leahy Smith America Invents Act [10] was signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011. The American Invents Act (AIA) was written and proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Lamar Smith. The bulk of the act changes and provides new guidelines for USPTO practices. [2] The American Intellectual Property Law Association refers to the AIA as the most comprehensive and important innovation reform in over 50 years. [3] Supporters claim that the reforms in the AIA eliminate major differences between the American patent system and international patent systems. [4] Key provisions in the act focus on reforming:

  • how patents are filed and examined.
  • how third parties may request patent reviews.
  • how prior user rights may be applied.
  • how the USPTO manages its fees and revenue.


Proposed Patent Reform

Innovation Act: The full title of the act is "To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes." [5]GovTrack predicts that the Innovation Act has a 36% chance of being enacted. Representative Bob Goodlatte intends for the bill to cut down on abusive patent litigation and strengthen a patent holder's rights.[6] The Innovation Act also proposes certain reforms to the enacted Leahy Smith America Invents Act.

The bill will target the following areas [6]:

  • Abusive patent litigation.
  • Increasing transparency and reducing weak patent infringement claims.
  • Clarifying patent litigation procedures and practices.
  • Bolstering IP centered small businesses.
  • Reducing referrals to random courts for the review of patent cases.
  • Weakening power of Patent Trolls.

Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act: The full title of the bill is "A bill to amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes." GovTrack predicts the PATENT Act has a 36% chance of being enacted. The bill is currently bipartisan with 3 Republican and 3 Democrat sponsors. [7]

The House Innovation Act and Senate Patent Act are very similar. Both acts address abusive litigation. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee want to reduce frivolous lawsuits, eliminate vague demand letters, and prevent extortion by passing the Patent Act. [8] The act focuses on the following areas [8]:

  • Increasing transparency on patent information and claims.
  • Reducing litigation costs.
  • Discouraging abusive litigation practices.

Bills Relevant to Innovation

Below is a table containing brief overviews of the bills pertaining to innovation that have been passed or introduced by the 114th Congress.

Bill Prognosis Sponsor Full Title Date Introduced Status
S. 1890: Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 [11] Enacted Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) A bill to amend chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code, to provide Federal jurisdiction for the theft of trade secrets, and for other purposes. JUL 29, 2015 Enacted — Signed by the President on May 11, 2016
H.R. 9: Innovation Act [12] 36% Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia) To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes. Feb 5, 2015 Reported by Committee on Jun 11, 2015
S. 1137: PATENT Act [13] 36% Charles “Chuck” Grassley (D-Iowa) A bill to amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes. Apr 29, 2015 Reported by Committee on Jun 4, 2015
H.R. 2045: Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015 [14] 24% Michael Burgess (R-Texas) To provide that certain bad faith communications in connection with the assertion of a United States patent are unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and for other purposes. Apr 28, 2015 Reported by Committee on Apr 29, 2015
H.R. 1832: Innovation Protection Act [15] 5% John Conyers Jr. (D-Michigan) To provide for the permanent funding of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and for other purposes. Apr 16, 2015 Referred to Committee on Apr 16, 2015
S. 632: STRONG Patents Act of 2015 [16] 4% Chris Coons (D-Delaware) A bill to strengthen the position of the United States as the world's leading innovator by amending title 35, United States Code, to protect the property rights of the inventors that grow the country's economy. Mar 3, 2015 Referred to Committee on Mar 3, 2015
S. 926: Grace Period Restoration Act of 2015 [17] 4% Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin) A bill to amend the patent law to promote basic research, to stimulate publication of scientific documents, to encourage collaboration in scientific endeavors, to improve the transfer of technology to the private sector, and for other purposes. Apr 14, 2015 Referred to Committee on Apr 14, 2015
H.R. 2370: End Anonymous Patents Act [18] 0% Theodore Deutch (D-Florida) To amend title 35, United States Code, to require disclosure of ownership and transfers of ownership of patents, and for other purposes. May 15, 2015 Referred to Committee on May 15, 2015
H.R. 1896: Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015 [19] 0% Jared Polis (D-Colorado) To amend chapter 26 of title 35, United States Code, to require the disclosure of information related to patent ownership, and for other purposes. Apr 20, 2015 Referred to Committee on Apr 20, 2015

Market of Ideas

Market of Ideas Research Notes

References

<references>

[5] [6] [8] [7]

[1]

  1. 1.0 1.1 [20] 'United States Patent and Trademark Office Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2015', "United States Patent and Trademark Office", (Alexandria, Virginia).
  2. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named wired
  3. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named AIPLA
  4. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named natlaw
  5. 5.0 5.1 [21] 'H.R. 9: Innovation Act', govtrack.us.
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 [22] 'The Innovation Act', Judiciary Committee: Chairman Bob Goodlatte, (Washington, D.C.).
  7. 7.0 7.1 [23] 'S.1137: PATENT Act', 'govtrack.us'.
  8. 8.0 8.1 8.2 [24] 'The Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT) Act: Short Summary', "Senate Committee on the Judiciary" (Washington, D.C).