Difference between revisions of "Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules"
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imported>Moshe (New page: Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012 ==Intergenerational Conflict=== *Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1 *Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass *Some chance of ref...) |
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+ | {{Article | ||
+ | |Has page=Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules | ||
+ | |Has bibtex key= | ||
+ | |Has article title=Voting on Majority Rules | ||
+ | |Has author=Messner, M. and M. Polborn | ||
+ | |Has year=2004 | ||
+ | |In journal= | ||
+ | |In volume= | ||
+ | |In number= | ||
+ | |Has pages= | ||
+ | |Has publisher= | ||
+ | }} | ||
Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]] | Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]] | ||
− | ==Intergenerational Conflict=== | + | ===Intergenerational Conflict=== |
− | |||
*Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1 | *Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1 | ||
*Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass | *Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass | ||
*Some chance of reform opportunity | *Some chance of reform opportunity | ||
− | *Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, <math> \ | + | *Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, <math>\infty</math>] |
+ | |||
+ | ====Results==== | ||
+ | *At any given time, median voter will be happy with simply majority | ||
+ | *However, median voter is only median for a split second, so if constitutional moment arises, he will choose super-majority | ||
+ | *While median voter prefer voting rule of <math>r(t_{m})=2c</math> for a current project, he prefers <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> to decide on all future projects. | ||
+ | *rule of <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> corresponds to <math>t_{s}=\frac{3}{4}>\frac{1}{2}</math> | ||
+ | *If we focus on welfare of all future generations obviously <math>t_{c}=\frac{1}{2}</math> | ||
+ | *If we focus on welfare of all those currently alive <math>t_{c}=\frac{2}{3}</math> |
Latest revision as of 19:15, 29 September 2020
Article | |
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Has bibtex key | |
Has article title | Voting on Majority Rules |
Has author | Messner, M. and M. Polborn |
Has year | 2004 |
In journal | |
In volume | |
In number | |
Has pages | |
Has publisher | |
© edegan.com, 2016 |
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
Intergenerational Conflict
- Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1
- Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass
- Some chance of reform opportunity
- Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, [math]\infty[/math]]
Results
- At any given time, median voter will be happy with simply majority
- However, median voter is only median for a split second, so if constitutional moment arises, he will choose super-majority
- While median voter prefer voting rule of [math]r(t_{m})=2c[/math] for a current project, he prefers [math]r(t_{m})=4c[/math] to decide on all future projects.
- rule of [math]r(t_{m})=4c[/math] corresponds to [math]t_{s}=\frac{3}{4}\gt \frac{1}{2}[/math]
- If we focus on welfare of all future generations obviously [math]t_{c}=\frac{1}{2}[/math]
- If we focus on welfare of all those currently alive [math]t_{c}=\frac{2}{3}[/math]