VC Bargaining

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A Basic Model

The players

The players are an Entrepreneur and a VC, both are risk neutral.

The Value Function

[math]V_t=V_{t-1} + f(x_t) - k \,[/math]

with

[math]V_0=0, f(0)=0, f'\gt 0, f''\lt 0, k\gt 0 \,[/math]

Having [math]k\gt 0\,[/math] forces a finite number of rounds as the optimal solution providing there is a stopping constraint on [math]V_t\,[/math] (so players don't invest forever).

One possible stopping constraint is:

[math]V_t \ge \overline{V}\,[/math]

with

[math]\overline{V} \sim F(V)\,[/math]

where the distribution is known to both parties.

Bargaining

In each period there is Rubenstein finite bargaining, with potentially different patience, and one player designated as last. This will give a single period equilibrium outcome with the parties having different bargaining strength.

Simple First Steps

Address the question: How does the optimal policy compare to the current way of calculating shares and values?

Assume a fixed number of rounds: [math]t={1,2}\,[/math] Assume a fixed total investment: [math]\sum_t x_t = 1\,[/math] Assume a functional form for [math]f(x_t): f(x_t) = ln (x_t)\,[/math]

Again [math] V(0)=0 \,[/math].

[math] \therefore V_2 = ln(x_1) + ln(x_2)\,[/math]