Difference between revisions of "PHDBA602 (Theory of the Firm)"
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===General Overviews=== | ===General Overviews=== | ||
| − | * | + | *Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf] [[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |(stub)]] |
*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf] | *Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf] | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===Background Literature=== | ||
| + | *Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf] [[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |(stub)]] | ||
| + | *Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] [[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |(stub)]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===Transaction Cost Economics=== | ||
| + | *Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf] [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |(stub)]] | ||
| + | *[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]], "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf] | ||
===Property Rights Model=== | ===Property Rights Model=== | ||
| − | * | + | *Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf] [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |(stub)]] |
| − | + | *Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1990)%20-%20Property%20Rights%20and%20the%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] [[Hart Moore (1990) - Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm|(stub)]] | |
===Multi-tasking=== | ===Multi-tasking=== | ||
| − | * | + | *Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] [[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |(stub)]] |
| − | Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991) | ||
===Centralization/Decentralization:=== | ===Centralization/Decentralization:=== | ||
| Line 41: | Line 51: | ||
*[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], "Adaptive Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf] | *[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], "Adaptive Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf] | ||
*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf] | *[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf] | ||
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Revision as of 20:16, 16 December 2010
PHDBA602 is a (for credit) Directed Studies course, that doctoral students can use to develop their own courses with a professor. This page provides information about a directed study course with Steve Tadelis on that centers arounds models that provide theories of the firm.
Contents
Format
The format is:
- One, perhaps two, models per class
- One class per week, with a timeslot TBD.
- The student will write up the model ahead of time (on this wiki)
- The class will be used to:
- Discuss intricacies of the model
- Discuss modelling choices, with a view to helping the student understand how to build models
- Place the model in the context of the broader literature
Papers
General Overviews
- Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf (stub)
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. pdf
Background Literature
- Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 pdf (stub)
- Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. pdf (stub)
Transaction Cost Economics
- Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 pdf (stub)
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
- Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. pdf
- Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 pdf
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. pdf
Property Rights Model
- Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf (stub)
- Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 pdf (stub)
Multi-tasking
- Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf (stub)
Centralization/Decentralization:
- Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
- Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf
Relational Contracting:
- Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999) "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 pdf
- Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 pdf
Firm Boundaries:
- Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
- Holmstrom, Bengt (1999), "The Firm As A Subeconomy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. pdf
Adaptation
- Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006), "Adaptive Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 pdf
- Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001), "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 pdf
