Difference between revisions of "PHDBA602 (Theory of the Firm)"
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*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf] | *[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf] | ||
| − | ===Relational Contracting=== | + | ===Relational Contracting:=== |
*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf] | *[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf] | ||
*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf] | *[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf] | ||
Revision as of 18:38, 27 November 2010
PHDBA602 is a (for credit) Directed Studies course, that doctoral students can use to develop their own courses with a professor. This page provides information about a directed study course with Steve Tadelis on that centers arounds models that provide theories of the firm.
Contents
Format
The format is:
- One, perhaps two, models per class
- One class per week, with a timeslot TBD.
- The student will write up the model ahead of time (on this wiki)
- The class will be used to:
- Discuss intricacies of the model
- Discuss modelling choices, with a view to helping the student understand how to build models
- Place the model in the context of the broader literature
Papers
Introduction
The following papers were suggested as a starting point:
- Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf
- Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf
- Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf
The Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989) also provides a chapter on the theory of the firm:
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. pdf
Centralization/Decentralization:
- Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
- Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf
Relational Contracting:
- Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999) "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 pdf
- Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 pdf
Firm Boundaries:
- Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
- Holmstrom, Bengt (1999), "The Firm As A Subeconomy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. pdf
Background Literature
The following papers provide seminal background material:
- Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 pdf
- Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. pdf
- Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 pdf
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
