Difference between revisions of "PHDBA279B Field Exam Papers"

From edegan.com
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Ed
imported>Ed
Line 10: Line 10:
 
*'''(A)''' Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]
−
*'''(A)''' Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press
+
*'''(A)''' Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(2001)%20-%20Special%20Interest%20Politics%20Chapters%204%20And%205.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]
 
*'''(A)''' Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]

Revision as of 19:11, 4 April 2010

The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279B 'Auctions and Contracts' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):

Morgan's Section

The following is a selection by Egan (Accepted or Rejected by Morgan):

  • (A) Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. link pdf
  • (R) Nitzan, Shmuel (1994), "Modeling Rent Seeking Contests", European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. link pdf
  • (A) Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf
  • (A) Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. link pdf
  • (A) Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press pdf
  • (A) Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf
  • (A) Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. link pdf
  • (A) Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. link pdf
  • (A) Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. link pdf

Nitzan (1994) was replaced by the paper that will be used for the 2012 class:

  • Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, link pdf

Morgan provided the following comment: "My question will take a model from one of these papers and change it in an interesting way. Reading these papers may or may not help you solve my question."

Tadelis' Section

The following is a complete list of the "key" (and required) readings from Steve's section:

  • Holmstrom B., (1999) "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 pdf
  • Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf
  • Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 pdf
  • Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through Google Books)
  • Tadelis, S. (2001) "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 pdf
  • Jin, G. and P. Leslie (2009) "Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 237-67 (Supplemental Reading) pdf
  • Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics pdf
  • McDevitt, Ryan (2010) "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," mimeo, northwestern university (pdf not available at this time)
  • McDevitt, Ryan (2010) "A Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality.," mimeo, northwestern university (pdf not available at this time)
  • Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008) "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. pdf
  • Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
  • Goldberg, Victor P. (1977) "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 pdf
  • Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000) "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. pdf
  • Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009) "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. pdf
Retrieved from "http://www.edegan.com/mediawiki/index.php?title=PHDBA279B_Field_Exam_Papers&oldid=33843"