PHDBA279A Field Exam Papers

• This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam

The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):

Part 1 - Dal Bo

Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez (Accepted or Rejected by Dal Bo):

• (A) Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
• (R) Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 pdf
• (R) Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. pdf
• (A) Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
• (A)(3) Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
• (A)(3) Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
• (A)(3) Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
• (A)(2) Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
• (A)(2) Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
• (A) Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
• (A)(1) Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf

Papers added by Dal Bo:

• (1) Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf

Note - Emphasis placed on (1) Control of Politicians, (2) Competition and influence, and (3) Efficiency of Democracy, in that order.

Part 2 - de Figueiredo

Papers selected by Egan and Hernadez:

• Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
• Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
• Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
• Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
• Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
• Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
• Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
• Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
• Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf

The following additional papers from our syllabus were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:

• Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. pdf
• Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. pdf
• Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. pdf

The following papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al. but were not in our syllabus:

• Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) - Institutional *Structure and the Logic
• Snyder (1991) - On Buying Legislatures
• Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities
• Grossman and Helpman (1994) Protection for Sale
• Snyder (1990) - Campaign Contributions as Investments
• Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) - Why is there so little money in US Politics

Note that of the above, Grossman and Helpman (1994)was included in Baron (2001), and Ansolabehere et al. (2003) should be included as it was referenced heavily.