Difference between revisions of "PHDBA279A Field Exam Papers"

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===Part 2 - de Figueiredo===
 
===Part 2 - de Figueiredo===
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Selected papers:
+
Papers selected by Egan and Hernadez:
 
*Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
 
*Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
 
*Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
 
*Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
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*Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]
 
*Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]
 
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization  21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]
 
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization  21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]
 +
 +
The following additional papers from our syllabus were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:
 +
*Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf]
 +
*Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science  35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]
 +
*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]
 +
 +
The following papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al. but were not in our syllabus:
 +
*Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) - Institutional *Structure and the Logic
 +
*Snyder (1991) - On Buying Legislatures
 +
*Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities
 +
*Grossman and Helpman (1994) Protection for Sale
 +
*Snyder (1990) - Campaign Contributions as Investments
 +
*Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) - Why is there so little money in US Politics
 +
 +
Note: Of the above, Grossman and Helpman was included in Baron (2001), and Ansolabehere et al. should be included as it was referenced heavily.

Revision as of 18:56, 4 March 2010

The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):

Part 1 - Dal Bo

Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez (Accepted or Rejected by Dal Bo):

  • (A) Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
  • (R) Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 pdf
  • (R) Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. pdf
  • (A) Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
  • (A)(3) Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
  • (A)(3) Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
  • (A)(3) Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
  • (A)(2) Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
  • (A)(2) Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
  • (A) Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
  • (A)(1) Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf

Papers added by Dal Bo:

  • (1) Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf

Note - Emphasis placed on (1) Control of Politicians, (2) Competition and influence, and (3) Efficiency of Democracy, in that order.

Part 2 - de Figueiredo

Papers selected by Egan and Hernadez:

  • Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
  • Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
  • Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
  • Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
  • de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
  • Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
  • Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
  • Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
  • Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
  • Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
  • de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf

The following additional papers from our syllabus were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:

  • Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. pdf
  • Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. pdf
  • Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. pdf

The following papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al. but were not in our syllabus:

  • Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) - Institutional *Structure and the Logic
  • Snyder (1991) - On Buying Legislatures
  • Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities
  • Grossman and Helpman (1994) Protection for Sale
  • Snyder (1990) - Campaign Contributions as Investments
  • Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) - Why is there so little money in US Politics

Note: Of the above, Grossman and Helpman was included in Baron (2001), and Ansolabehere et al. should be included as it was referenced heavily.

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