Difference between revisions of "PHDBA279A Field Exam Papers"
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===Part 1 - Dal Bo=== | ===Part 1 - Dal Bo=== | ||
| − | + | Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez: | |
*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] | *Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] | ||
*Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf] | *Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf] | ||
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*Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] | *Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] | ||
*Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] | *Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | |||
| + | Short list by Dal Bo: | ||
| + | *Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(3)'''Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(3)'''Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(3)'''Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(2)''' Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(2)''' Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(1)''' Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(1)''' Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | |||
| + | Note - Emphasis placed on (1) Control of Politicians, (2) Competition and influence, and (3) Efficiency of Democracy. | ||
===Part 2 - de Figueiredo=== | ===Part 2 - de Figueiredo=== | ||
Revision as of 20:36, 2 March 2010
- This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):
Part 1 - Dal Bo
Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez:
- Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
- Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 pdf
- Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. pdf
- Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
- Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
- Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
- Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
- Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
- Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
- Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
- Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf
Short list by Dal Bo:
- Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
- Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
- (3)Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
- (3)Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
- (3)Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
- (2) Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
- (2) Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
- Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
- (1) Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf
- (1) Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf
Note - Emphasis placed on (1) Control of Politicians, (2) Competition and influence, and (3) Efficiency of Democracy.
Part 2 - de Figueiredo
Selected papers:
- Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
- Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
- Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
- Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
- de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
- Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
- Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
- Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
- Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
- Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
- de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf
