Difference between revisions of "PHDBA279A 2011"
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*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf] | *Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf] | ||
*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] | *Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | * Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225. | ||
| + | * Laffont, J-J., and J.Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Chapter 11 (up to section 11.5 incl.). | ||
| + | * Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240. | ||
| + | * Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21. | ||
Revision as of 15:00, 2 December 2011
New papers:
- A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation by Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole.
Problem Sets:
Ernesto: Papers covered in class:
- Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
- Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). pdf. Presentation in 2011 version of class: pdf.
- Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). pdf
- Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
- Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. pdf
- Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
- Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
- Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
- Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. pdf
- Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
- Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(2), 203-225.
- Laffont, J-J., and J.Tirole (1993) “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” (MIT Press) – Chapter 11 (up to section 11.5 incl.).
- Peltzman, S. (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Vol. 19, Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211-240.
- Stigler, George J. (1971), The Regulation of Industry, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3-21.
