BPP Field Exam Papers 2012

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NOTE: This is for 2012. For 2011, see BPP Field Exam Papers For 2010, see 2010 BPP Field Exam Papers.

Polictical Science

Dal Bo

1.) Spatial voting and legislative institutions (Lecture 1 Class Slides)

• Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. pdf
• Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice", 37, 503-19. pdf
• Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. pdf
• McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472?482. pdf

2.) Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Lecture 2 Class Slides)

• Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004),Voting on Majority Rules Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
• Knight, B. (2000).Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). pdf. Presentation in 2011 version of class: pdf.
• Dal Bó, E. (2006) Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). pdf

5.) Policy for Sale (Lecture 8 Class Slides)

• Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
• Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. pdf
• Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf

6.) Vote Buying

• J. Snyder (1991), "On Buying Legislators," Economics and Politics.
• T. Groseclose and J. Snyder (1993), Buying Supermajorities," American Political Science Review.

8.) Competition for influence and the efficiency of democracy

• Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf (Slides #6)
• Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf (Slides #6)
• Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. pdf
• Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf (Slides #6)

9.) Economics of Utility Regulation

• Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. pdf
• Laffont, JJ and J. Tirole(1993)"A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation - Chapter 1

13.-14.) Regulatory Capture & Rents and Institutions in the electoral Control of Politicians

• Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf (Slides #9)
• Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf (Slides #9)

Rui's Paper List

The paper list by class number is as follows (Zip of part 2 papers):

3-4.) Models of Legislative Policymaking

• Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. pdf
• Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
• Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. pdf
• Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
• Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
• Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. pdf

7.) Applications to Non-Market Strategy

• Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. pdf
• Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)

13.) Whistleblowing and Delay

• Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf (Class Handout and Class Slides)
• Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper. pdf
• Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf

14.) Economic Policymaking

• Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
• Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf

15,16.) Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments

• Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
• Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
• Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. pdf

See also: BPP Political Science

Innovation (Mowery)

See also: BPP Innovation

1. S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc
2. P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.
3. Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
4. Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
5. Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
6. Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
7. Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
8. Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
9. Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
10. Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf

Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)

Dal Bo

1. Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. pdf
2. Salop (1979), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. pdf
3. Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. pdf (Class Slides)
4. Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. pdf
5. Vertical Differentiation
6. Research and Development and the Adoption of new Technologies pdf

Tadelis

See notes on Steve's innovation section here.

1. Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
2. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
3. Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572
4. Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. pdf
5. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf
6. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf
7. Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf
8. Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf
9. Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
10. Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,” NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])

de Figueiredo

1. Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series", Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. pdf
2. Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. pdf
3. Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. pdf
4. Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000), "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. pdf
5. Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity. Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403.
6. Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q", Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. pdf
7. Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount", Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. pdf
8. Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. pdf
9. Teece, D. (1982), "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. pdf

Institutions

Yuchtman

• North & Weingast (1989)
• Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2005)
• Hornbeck (2010)
• Naidu (2010)
• Grief (1993)
• Clark (1985)
• Shue (2011)
• La Porta et al (2008)
• Hansmann (1988)
• Bubb (2009)
• Levin and Tadelis (2005)

For the Papers below, see summaries here.

• Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
• Manning (2003)
• Lazear (2000)
• Bandiera et al (2007)

Tadelis

See Notes from Steve's institution section here.

• Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63
• Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340
• Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326.
• Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719.
• Tadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) Transaction-Cost Economics, to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press
• Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857.
• Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production, Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904.

Auctions and Contracts

See PHDBA279B.

Morgan

1. Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. link pdf
2. Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. link pdf
3. Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003), "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. link pdf
4. Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf
5. Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf
6. Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press pdf
7. Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. link pdf
8. Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, link pdf
9. Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. link pdf

The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:

• Introduction
• Auctions
• Adverse Selection
• Contests
• Costless Signalling

Tadelis

1. Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000), "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. pdf
2. Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 pdf
3. Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009), "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. pdf
4. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf
5. Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 pdf
6. Holmstrom B., (1999), "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 pdf
7. Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through Google Books)
8. Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008), "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. pdf
9. Tadelis, S. (2001), "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 pdf
10. Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf