Difference between revisions of "BPP Field Exam Papers"
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<nowiki>*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]</nowiki> | <nowiki>*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]</nowiki> | ||
− | + | <b>NOTE: This is for 2011. For 2010, see [[2010 BPP Field Exam Papers]]</b>. | |
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===Innovation (Mowery)=== | ===Innovation (Mowery)=== | ||
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# [[S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc]] | # [[S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc]] | ||
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# [[P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.]] | # [[P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.]] | ||
#'''[[Agrawal Henderson (2002) - Putting Patents In Context Exploring Knowledge Transfer From Mit |Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002)]]''', "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Agrawal%20Henderson%20(2002)%20-%20Putting%20Patents%20in%20Context%20Exploring%20Knowledge%20Transfer%20from%20MIT.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Agrawal Henderson (2002) - Putting Patents In Context Exploring Knowledge Transfer From Mit |Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002)]]''', "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Agrawal%20Henderson%20(2002)%20-%20Putting%20Patents%20in%20Context%20Exploring%20Knowledge%20Transfer%20from%20MIT.pdf pdf] | ||
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#'''[[Gompers Lerner Sharfstein (2003) - Entrepreneurial Spawning |Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003)]]''', "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Gompers Lerner Sharfstein (2003) - Entrepreneurial Spawning |Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003)]]''', "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf] | ||
#'''[[Henderson Clark (1990) - Architectural Innovation |Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990)]]''', "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Henderson Clark (1990) - Architectural Innovation |Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990)]]''', "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf] | ||
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#'''[[Mowery Ziedonis (2001) - How Has The Bayh Dole Act Affected Us University Patenting And Licensing |Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001)]]''', "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%20(2001)%20-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Mowery Ziedonis (2001) - How Has The Bayh Dole Act Affected Us University Patenting And Licensing |Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001)]]''', "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%20(2001)%20-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing.pdf pdf] | ||
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#'''[[Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation |Teece, D.J. (1986)]]''', "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation |Teece, D.J. (1986)]]''', "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf] | ||
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#'''[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In |Ziedonis, R.H. (2004)]]''', "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20(2004)%20-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In |Ziedonis, R.H. (2004)]]''', "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20(2004)%20-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in.pdf pdf] | ||
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===Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)=== | ===Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)=== | ||
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====Tadelis==== | ====Tadelis==== | ||
+ | See notes on Steve's innovation section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Strategy%20Notes.pdf here]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | #[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,”]] American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September. | ||
+ | #[[Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572]] | ||
#[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004)]], "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf] | #[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004)]], "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf] | ||
#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf] | #[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf] | ||
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Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] | Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] | ||
#[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf] | #[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | # [[Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,”]] NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link]) | ||
====de Figueiredo==== | ====de Figueiredo==== | ||
− | #[[Eisenhardt Martin (2000) - Dynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf] | + | #[[Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series"]], Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Villalonga%20(2004)%20-%20Diversification%20discount%20or%20premium.pdf pdf] |
− | #[[ | + | #[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997)]], "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf] |
+ | #[[Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage"]], Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cockburn%20Henderson%20Stern%20(2000)%20-%20Untangling%20the%20origins%20of%20competitive%20advantage.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Eisenhardt Martin (2000) - Dynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity]]. Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403. | ||
+ | #[[Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q"]], Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Montgomery%20Wernerfelt%20(1988)%20-%20Diversification%20Ricardian%20rents%20and%20Tobins%20q.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount"]], Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Campa%20Kedia%20(2002)%20-%20Explaining%20the%20diversification%20discount.pdf pdf] | ||
+ | #[[Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise"]], Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1980)%20-%20Economies%20of%20scope%20and%20the%20scope%20of%20the%20enterprise.pdf pdf] | ||
#[[Teece (1982) - Towards An Economic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, D. (1982)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf] | #[[Teece (1982) - Towards An Economic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, D. (1982)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf] | ||
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− | + | ===Institutions === | |
− | + | See also: [[ECON224]] | |
+ | ====Tadelis==== | ||
+ | See Notes from Steve's institution section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Institutions%20Notes.pdf here]. | ||
− | + | * [[Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms."]] Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63 | |
+ | * Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340 | ||
+ | * [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]], Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326. | ||
+ | * [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719. | ||
+ | * [[Tadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) Transaction-Cost Economics]], to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press | ||
+ | * Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857. | ||
+ | * [[Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]], Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904. | ||
− | + | ====Yuchtman==== | |
+ | * [[North & Weingast (1989)]] | ||
+ | * [[Naidu (2010)]] | ||
+ | * [[Grief (1993)]] | ||
+ | * [[Clark (1985)]] | ||
+ | * [http://www.edegan.com/repository/La%20Porta%20et%20al%20%282008%29%20Summary.pdf La Porta et al (2008)] | ||
+ | * [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Hansmann%20%281988%29%20Summary.pdf Hansmann (1988)] | ||
+ | * [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Bubb%20and%20Kaufman%20%282009%29%20Summary.pdf Bubb (2009)] | ||
+ | * [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Levin%20and%20Tadelis%20%282005%29%20Summary.pdf Levin and Tadelis (2005)] | ||
− | + | For the Papers below, see summaries [http://www.edegan.com/repository/279D%20%28Noam%29%20-%20Paper%20Summaries.pdf here]. | |
− | + | * Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) | |
− | + | * Manning (2003) | |
− | + | * Lazear (2000) | |
− | + | * Bandiera et al (2007) | |
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===Polictical Science=== | ===Polictical Science=== | ||
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===Auctions and Contracts=== | ===Auctions and Contracts=== | ||
+ | See [[PHDBA279B]]. | ||
+ | ====Morgan==== | ||
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#[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf] | #[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf] | ||
#'''[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf] | ||
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#'''[[Tadelis (2001) - The Market For Reputations As An Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001)]]''', "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Tadelis (2001) - The Market For Reputations As An Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001)]]''', "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf] | ||
#'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf] | #'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf] | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:11, 15 June 2011
- This page is in the BPP category
- This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
Insert the following code at the head of each page in this section: *This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]
NOTE: This is for 2011. For 2010, see 2010 BPP Field Exam Papers.
Contents
Innovation (Mowery)
See also: BPP Innovation
- S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc
- P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.
- Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
- Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
- Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
- Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
- Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
- Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
- Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
- Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf
Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)
Dal Bo
- Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. pdf (Class Slides)
- Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. pdf
- Salop (1979), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. pdf
- Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. pdf
Tadelis
See notes on Steve's innovation section here.
- Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
- Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
- Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572
- Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. pdf
- Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf
- Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf
- Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf
- Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf
- Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
- Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,” NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])
de Figueiredo
- Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series", Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. pdf
- Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. pdf
- Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. pdf
- Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000), "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. pdf
- Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity. Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403.
- Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q", Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. pdf
- Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount", Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. pdf
- Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. pdf
- Teece, D. (1982), "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. pdf
Institutions
See also: ECON224
Tadelis
See Notes from Steve's institution section here.
- Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63
- Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340
- Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process, Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326.
- Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719.
- Tadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) Transaction-Cost Economics, to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press
- Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857.
- Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production, Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904.
Yuchtman
- North & Weingast (1989)
- Naidu (2010)
- Grief (1993)
- Clark (1985)
- La Porta et al (2008)
- Hansmann (1988)
- Bubb (2009)
- Levin and Tadelis (2005)
For the Papers below, see summaries here.
- Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
- Manning (2003)
- Lazear (2000)
- Bandiera et al (2007)
Polictical Science
Dal Bo
- Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf (Slides #9)
- Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf (Slides #6)
- Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf (Slides #8)
- Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf (Slides #6)
- Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf (Slides #4)
- Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf (Slides #7)
- Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf (Slides #9)
- Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf (Slides #7)
- Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf (Slides #2)
- Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf (Slides #6)
Slide Sets referenced are:
- Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Slides #2)
- Externalities in voting games (Slides #4)
- The efficiency of democracy (Slides #6)
- Competition and influence (Slides #7)
- Corruption deterrence (Slides #8)
- The electoral control of politicians (Slides #9)
de Figueiredo
See also: BPP Political Science
- Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
- Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf (Class Handout and Class Slides)
- Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
- Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
- Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
- de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
- de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
- Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
- Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
- Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
- Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, available on his website pdf (Class Slides: Set1 Set2, © Adrienne Hosek)
Auctions and Contracts
See PHDBA279B.
Morgan
- Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. link pdf
- Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. link pdf
- Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003), "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. link pdf
- Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf
- Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf
- Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press pdf
- Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. link pdf
- Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, link pdf
- Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. link pdf
The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:
Tadelis
- Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000), "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. pdf
- Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 pdf
- Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009), "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. pdf
- Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf
- Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 pdf
- Holmstrom B., (1999), "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 pdf
- Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through Google Books)
- Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008), "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. pdf
- Tadelis, S. (2001), "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 pdf
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf