Difference between revisions of "BPP Field Exam Papers"

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*This page is in the [[BPP]] category [[Category:BPP]]
 
*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]
 
*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]
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Insert the following code at the head of each page in this section:
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<nowiki>*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]</nowiki>
  
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=Summary=
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<b>NOTE: This is for 2011. For 2010, see [[2010 BPP Field Exam Papers]]</b>.
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The following is the count of papers by topic:
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'''Innovation:'''                  '''12+2'''
+
===Innovation (Mowery)===
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    Mowery:                  12+2
 
−
'''Strategy:'''                    '''12+1'''
 
−
    Dal Bo:                    4
 
−
    Tadelis:                  4
 
−
    de Figueiredo:            4+1
 
−
'''Institutions:'''                '''23'''
 
−
    Spiller:                  23
 
−
'''Polictical Science:'''          '''21'''
 
−
    Dal Bo:                  10
 
−
    de Figueiredo:            11
 
−
'''Auctions and Contracts:'''      '''23'''
 
−
    Morgan:                    9
 
−
    Tadelis:                  14
 
−
 
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'''Total:'''                      '''91+3'''
 
−
'''Total (no dups):'''            '''89+3'''
 
  
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=BPP Field Exam Paper Short List=
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See also: [[BPP Innovation]]
  
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==Innovation (Mowery)==
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# [[S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc]]
−
#[[Agrawal Henderson (2002) - Putting Patents In Context Exploring Knowledge Transfer From Mit |Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002)]], "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Agrawal%20Henderson%20(2002)%20-%20Putting%20Patents%20in%20Context%20Exploring%20Knowledge%20Transfer%20from%20MIT.pdf pdf]
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# [[P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.]]
−
#[[Arrow (1959) - Economic Welfare And The Allocation Of Resources For Invention |Arrow, K.J. (1958)]], "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Arrow%20(1959)%20-%20Economic%20Welfare%20and%20the%20Allocation%20of%20Resources%20for%20Invention.pdf pdf]
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#'''[[Agrawal Henderson (2002) - Putting Patents In Context Exploring Knowledge Transfer From Mit |Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002)]]''', "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Agrawal%20Henderson%20(2002)%20-%20Putting%20Patents%20in%20Context%20Exploring%20Knowledge%20Transfer%20from%20MIT.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Cohen Levinthal (1990) - Absorptive Capacity |Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990)]], "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cohen%20Levinthal%20(1990)%20-%20Absorptive%20Capacity.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Arrow (1959) - Economic Welfare And The Allocation Of Resources For Invention |Arrow, K.J. (1958)]]''', "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Arrow%20(1959)%20-%20Economic%20Welfare%20and%20the%20Allocation%20of%20Resources%20for%20Invention.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Gompers Lerner Sharfstein (2003) - Entrepreneurial Spawning |Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003)]], "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Cohen Levinthal (1990) - Absorptive Capacity |Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990)]]''', "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cohen%20Levinthal%20(1990)%20-%20Absorptive%20Capacity.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Henderson Clark (1990) - Architectural Innovation |Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990)]], "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Gompers Lerner Sharfstein (2003) - Entrepreneurial Spawning |Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003)]]''', "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Lamoreaux Sokoloff (2005) - Decline Of The Independent Inventor |Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (2005)]], "Decline of the Independent Inventor: A Schumpeterian Story", NBER working paper #11654. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lamoreaux%20Sokoloff%20(2005)%20-%20Decline%20of%20the%20Independent%20Inventor.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Henderson Clark (1990) - Architectural Innovation |Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990)]]''', "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Mowery Ziedonis (2001) - How Has The Bayh Dole Act Affected Us University Patenting And Licensing |Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001)]], "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%20(2001)%20-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Mowery Ziedonis (2001) - How Has The Bayh Dole Act Affected Us University Patenting And Licensing |Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001)]]''', "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%20(2001)%20-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Murray Stern (2005) - Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder The Free Flow Of Scientific Knowledge |Murray F., and S. Stern (2005)]], "Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis", NBER working paper #11465. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Murray%20Stern%20(2005)%20-%20Do%20formal%20intellectual%20property%20rights%20hinder%20the%20free%20flow%20of%20scientific%20knowledge.pdf pdf]
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#'''[[Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation |Teece, D.J. (1986)]]''', "Profiting from technological innovation:  Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Nelson (1959) - The Simple Economics Of Basic Scientific Research |Nelson, R.R. (1959)]], "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research", Journal of Political Economy 67, 297-306. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nelson%20(1959)%20-%20The%20Simple%20Economics%20of%20Basic%20Scientific%20Research.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In |Ziedonis, R.H. (2004)]]''', "Don't fence me in:  Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20(2004)%20-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation |Teece, D.J. (1986)]], "Profiting from technological innovation:  Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Thursby Fuller Thursby (2007) - Us Faculty Patenting Inside And Outside The University |Thursby J., A. Fuller,  & M. Thursby (2007)]], "US Faculty Patenting Inside and Outside the University", NBER working paper #13256. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Thursby%20Fuller%20Thursby%20(2007)%20-%20US%20Faculty%20Patenting%20Inside%20and%20Outside%20the%20University.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In |Ziedonis, R.H. (2004)]], "Don't fence me in:  Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20(2004)%20-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in.pdf pdf]
 
  
−
Unapproved additions:
+
===Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)===
−
#[[Merges (1999) - As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast |Merges, R. P. (1999)]], "As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform", Berkeley Technology Law Journal. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Merges%20(1999)%20-%20As%20Many%20as%20Six%20Impossible%20Patents%20before%20Breakfast.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Mowery  (2009) - Plus Ca Change |Mowery, D.C. (2009)]], "Plus ca change: Industrial R&D in the Third Industrial Revolution", forthcoming, Industrial and Corporate Change. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20%20(2009)%20-%20Plus%20ca%20change.pdf pdf]
 
  
−
==Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)==
+
====Dal Bo====
 +
#'''[[Dixit Stiglitz (1977) - Monopolistic Competition And Optimum Product Diversity |Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977)]]''', "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20and%20optimum%20product%20diversity.pdf pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Class%20Slides.pdf (Class Slides)]
 +
#'''[[Hotelling (1929) - Stability In Competition |Hotelling, H. (1929)]]''', "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hotelling%20(1929)%20-%20Stability%20in%20competition.pdf pdf]
 +
#'''[[Salop (1979) - Monopolistic Competition With Outside Goods |Salop (1979)]]''', "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Salop%20(1979)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20with%20outside%20goods.pdf pdf]
 +
#'''[[Shaked Sutton (1982) - Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation |Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982)]]''', "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shaked%20Sutton%20(1982)%20-%20Relaxing%20price%20competition%20through%20product%20differentiation.pdf pdf]
  
−
===Dal Bo===
+
====Tadelis====
−
#[[Dixit Stiglitz (1977) - Monopolistic Competition And Optimum Product Diversity |Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977)]], "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20and%20optimum%20product%20diversity.pdf pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Class%20Slides.pdf (Class Slides)]
+
See notes on Steve's innovation section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Strategy%20Notes.pdf here].
−
#[[Hotelling (1929) - Stability In Competition |Hotelling, H. (1929)]], "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hotelling%20(1929)%20-%20Stability%20in%20competition.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Salop (1979) - Monopolistic Competition With Outside Goods |Salop (1979)]], "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Salop%20(1979)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20with%20outside%20goods.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Shaked Sutton (1982) - Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation |Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982)]], "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shaked%20Sutton%20(1982)%20-%20Relaxing%20price%20competition%20through%20product%20differentiation.pdf pdf]
 
  
−
===Tadelis===
+
#[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,”]] American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
 +
#[[Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572]]
 
#[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004)]], "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004)]], "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
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Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]
 
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
 +
# [[Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,”]] NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])
  
−
===de Figueiredo===
+
====de Figueiredo====
−
#[[Eisenhardt Martin (2000) - Dynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series"]], Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Villalonga%20(2004)%20-%20Diversification%20discount%20or%20premium.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Montgomery (1994) - Corporate Diversification |Montgomery, C. (1994)]], "Corporate diversification", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, pp.163-178. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Montgomery%20(1994)%20-%20Corporate%20diversification.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997)]], "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage"]], Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cockburn%20Henderson%20Stern%20(2000)%20-%20Untangling%20the%20origins%20of%20competitive%20advantage.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Eisenhardt Martin (2000) - Dynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf]  
 +
#[[Schoar A.  (2002),  Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity]].  Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403.
 +
#[[Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q"]], Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Montgomery%20Wernerfelt%20(1988)%20-%20Diversification%20Ricardian%20rents%20and%20Tobins%20q.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount"]], Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Campa%20Kedia%20(2002)%20-%20Explaining%20the%20diversification%20discount.pdf pdf]
 +
#[[Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise"]], Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1980)%20-%20Economies%20of%20scope%20and%20the%20scope%20of%20the%20enterprise.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Teece (1982) - Towards An Economic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, D. (1982)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Teece (1982) - Towards An Economic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, D. (1982)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997)]], "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf]
 
  
−
Unapproved Additions:
+
===Institutions ===
−
#[[Winter (2003) - Understanding Dynamic Capabilities |Winter, S. (2003)]], "Understanding dynamic capabilities", Strategic Management Journal, 24, pp.991-995. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Winter%20(2003)%20-%20Understanding%20dynamic%20capabilities.pdf pdf]
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See also: [[ECON224]]
 +
====Tadelis====
 +
See Notes from Steve's institution section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Institutions%20Notes.pdf here].
 +
 
 +
* [[Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms."]] Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63
 +
* Holmstrom,  Bengt  (1982)  Moral  Hazard  in  Teams,  Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340
 +
* [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]], Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326.
 +
* [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719.  
 +
* [[Tadelis,  Steven  and  Oliver  Williamson  (2011) Transaction-Cost Economics]], to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds.  The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press
 +
* Levin,  Jonathan  (2003)  "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857.
 +
* [[Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]], Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904.
 +
 
 +
====Yuchtman====
 +
* [[North & Weingast (1989)]]
 +
* [[Naidu (2010)]]
 +
* [[Grief (1993)]]
 +
* [[Clark (1985)]]
 +
* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/La%20Porta%20et%20al%20%282008%29%20Summary.pdf La Porta et al (2008)]
 +
* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Hansmann%20%281988%29%20Summary.pdf Hansmann (1988)]
 +
* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Bubb%20and%20Kaufman%20%282009%29%20Summary.pdf Bubb (2009)]
 +
* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Levin%20and%20Tadelis%20%282005%29%20Summary.pdf Levin and Tadelis (2005)]
 +
 
 +
For the Papers below, see summaries [http://www.edegan.com/repository/279D%20%28Noam%29%20-%20Paper%20Summaries.pdf here].
 +
* Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
 +
* Manning (2003)
 +
* Lazear (2000)
 +
* Bandiera et al (2007)
 +
 
 +
===Polictical Science===
  
−
==Institutions (Spiller)==
+
====Dal Bo====
−
#[[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972)]], "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
−
#[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations |Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999)]], "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
−
#[[Baker Hubbard (2003) - Make Vs Buy In Trucking |Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003)]], "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])
−
#[[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |Coase, Ronald (1937)]], "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Coate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995)]], On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
−
#[[Demsetz (1968) - Why Regulate Utilities |Demsetz, Harold (1968)]], "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E. (2007)]], Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4])
−
#[[Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production |Garicano, Luis (2000)]], "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])
−
#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
−
#[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multitask Principal Agent Analyses |Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])
−
#[[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978)]], "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])
−
#[[Levy Spiller (1994) - The Institutional Foundations Of Regulatory Commitment |Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994)]], "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]
+
#[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
−
#[[Mccubbins Schwartz (1984) - Congressional Oversight Overlooked |McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984)]], "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Mccubbins Noll Weingast (1987) - Administrative Procedures As Instruments Of Control |
 
−
McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987)]], "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Monteverde Teece (1982) - Supplier Switching Costs And Vertical Integration In The Automobile Industry |Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982)]], "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[North (1991) - Institutions |North, Douglass (1991)]]. "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Prendergast (2003) - The Limits Of Bureaucratic Efficiency |Prendergast, Canice (2003)]], "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[Spiller (2008) - An Institutional Theory Of Public Contracts Regulatory Implications |Spiller, Pablo (2008)]], "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts:  Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[Spiller Gely (1992) - Congressional Control Or Judicial Independence |Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992)]], "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[Weingast Marshall (1988) - The Industrial Organization Of Congress |Weingast and Marshall (1988)]], "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[Whinston (2003) - On The Transaction Costs Determinants Of Vertical Integration |Whinston (2003)]], "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]
 
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#[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]], "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Williamson (1983) - Credible Commitments Using Hostages To Support Exchange |Williamson, Oliver, (1983)]], "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]
 
  
−
==Polictical Science==
+
Slide Sets referenced are:
 +
*'''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])
 +
*'''Externalities in voting games''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4])
 +
*'''The efficiency of democracy''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
 +
*'''Competition and influence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])
 +
*'''Corruption deterrence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])
 +
*'''The electoral control of politicians''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
  
−
===Dal Bo===
+
====de Figueiredo====
−
#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Coate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995)]], On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E. (2007)]], Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]
 
  
−
===de Figueiredo===
+
See also: [[BPP Political Science]]
−
#[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]], Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]]''', Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]], Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides],  © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)
+
#'''[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]]''', Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides])
−
#[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001)]], Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])
+
#'''[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001)]]''', Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])
−
#[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]], Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])
+
#'''[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]]''', Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])
−
#[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]], Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]]''', Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
−
#[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]], Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]]''', Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]
−
#[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002)]], Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002)]]''', Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J.  (1994)]], Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J.  (1994)]]''', Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991)]], Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991)]]''', Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]]''', Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting, Michael (2009)]], "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2],  © Adrienne Hosek)
+
#'''[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting, Michael (2009)]]''', "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2],  © Adrienne Hosek)
  
−
==Auctions and Contracts==
+
===Auctions and Contracts===
 +
See [[PHDBA279B]].
 +
====Morgan====
  
−
===Morgan===
 
 
#[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]
−
'''#[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Caillaud Jullien (2003) - Chicken And Egg |Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003)]], "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Caillaud Jullien (2003) - Chicken And Egg |Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003)]]''', "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Dessein (2002) - Authority And Communication In Organizations |Dessein, Wouter (2002)]], "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Dessein (2002) - Authority And Communication In Organizations |Dessein, Wouter (2002)]], "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Ellison Fudenberg Mobius (2004) - Competing Auctions |Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004)]], "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Ellison Fudenberg Mobius (2004) - Competing Auctions |Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004)]], "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Grossman Helpman (2001) - Special Interest Politics Chapters 4 And 5 |Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001)]], "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(2001)%20-%20Special%20Interest%20Politics%20Chapters%204%20And%205.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Grossman Helpman (2001) - Special Interest Politics Chapters 4 And 5 |Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001)]]''', "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(2001)%20-%20Special%20Interest%20Politics%20Chapters%204%20And%205.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Hart Moore (1988) - Incomplete Contracts And Renegotiation |Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988)]], "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Hart Moore (1988) - Incomplete Contracts And Renegotiation |Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988)]], "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Konrad (2007) - Strategy In Contests-An Introduction |Konrad, Kai A. (2007)]], "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960458 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Konrad%20(2007)%20-%20Strategy%20in%20Contests-An%20Introduction.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Konrad (2007) - Strategy In Contests-An Introduction |Konrad, Kai A. (2007)]]''', "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960458 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Konrad%20(2007)%20-%20Strategy%20in%20Contests-An%20Introduction.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Krishna Morgan (2008) - Contracting For Information Under Imperfect Commitment |Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008)]], "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Krishna Morgan (2008) - Contracting For Information Under Imperfect Commitment |Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008)]], "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]
  
−
===Tadelis===
+
The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:
 +
*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes1-Introduction.pdf Introduction]
 +
*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes2-Auctions.pdf Auctions]
 +
*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes3-AdverseSelection.pdf Adverse Selection]
 +
*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes4-Contests.pdf Contests]
 +
*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes5-CostlessSignaling.pdf Costless Signalling]
 +
 
 +
====Tadelis====
 
#[[Banerjee Duflo (2000) - Reputation Effects And The Limits Of Contracting |Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000)]], "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Banerjee%20Duflo%20(2000)%20-%20Reputation%20Effects%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Contracting.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Banerjee Duflo (2000) - Reputation Effects And The Limits Of Contracting |Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000)]], "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Banerjee%20Duflo%20(2000)%20-%20Reputation%20Effects%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Contracting.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Cabral Hortacsu (2008) - Dynamics Of Seller Reputation |Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008)]], "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics  [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cabral%20Hortacsu%20(2008)%20-%20Dynamics%20of%20Seller%20Reputation.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Diamond (1989) - Reputation Acquisition In Debt Markets |Diamond, D. (1989)]]''', "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Diamond%20(1989)%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in%20Debt%20Markets.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Diamond (1989) - Reputation Acquisition In Debt Markets |Diamond, D. (1989)]], "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Diamond%20(1989)%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in%20Debt%20Markets.pdf pdf]
 
 
#[[Forbes Lederman (2009) - Adaptation And Vertical Integration In The Airline Industry |Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009)]], "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Forbes%20Lederman%20(2009)%20-%20Adaptation%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Airline%20Industry.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Forbes Lederman (2009) - Adaptation And Vertical Integration In The Airline Industry |Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009)]], "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Forbes%20Lederman%20(2009)%20-%20Adaptation%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Airline%20Industry.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Gibbons Murphy (1992) - Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns |Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992)]], "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1992)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Gibbons Murphy (1992) - Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns |Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992)]]''', "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1992)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Goldberg (1977) - Competitive Bidding And The Production Of Precontract Information |Goldberg, Victor P. (1977)]], "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1977)%20-%20Competitive%20Bidding%20and%20the%20Production%20of%20Precontract%20Information.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Goldberg (1977) - Competitive Bidding And The Production Of Precontract Information |Goldberg, Victor P. (1977)]]''', "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1977)%20-%20Competitive%20Bidding%20and%20the%20Production%20of%20Precontract%20Information.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Holmstrom (1999) - Managerial Incentive Problems |Holmstrom B., (1999)]], "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Holmstrom (1999) - Managerial Incentive Problems |Holmstrom B., (1999)]]''', "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Jin Leslie (2009) - Reputational Incentives For Restaurant Hygiene |Jin, G. and P. Leslie (2009)]], "Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 237-67 (Supplemental Reading) [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Jin%20Leslie%20(2009)%20-%20Reputational%20Incentives%20for%20Restaurant%20Hygiene.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Kreps (1990) - Corporate Culture And Economic Theory |Kreps, D. (1990)]]''', "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JBrDXvye-1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA221&dq=Kreps,+D.++%22Corporate+Culture+and+Economic+Theory&ots=d4JUQusjjf&sig=7RVgXjAlocVC8FDJd2Ke1MsbjxY Google Books])
−
#[[Kreps (1990) - Corporate Culture And Economic Theory |Kreps, D. (1990)]], "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JBrDXvye-1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA221&dq=Kreps,+D.++%22Corporate+Culture+and+Economic+Theory&ots=d4JUQusjjf&sig=7RVgXjAlocVC8FDJd2Ke1MsbjxY Google Books])
 
 
#[[Levin Tadelis (2008) - Contracting For Government Services |Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008)]], "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levin%20Tadelis%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20Government%20Services.pdf pdf]
 
#[[Levin Tadelis (2008) - Contracting For Government Services |Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008)]], "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levin%20Tadelis%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20Government%20Services.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Mcdevitt (2010) - Names And Reputations An Empirical Analysis |McDevitt, Ryan (2010)]], "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," mimeo, northwestern university [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McDevitt%20(2010)%20-%20Names%20and%20Reputations%20An%20Empirical%20Analysis.pdf pdf]
+
#'''[[Tadelis (2001) - The Market For Reputations As An Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001)]]''', "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf]
−
#[[Mcdevitt (2010) - A Business By Any Other Name Firm Name Choice As A Signal Of Firm Quality |
+
#'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
−
McDevitt, Ryan (2010)]], "A Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality.," mimeo, northwestern university [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McDevitt%20(2010)%20-%20A%20Business%20by%20Any%20Other%20Name%20Firm%20Name%20Choice%20as%20a%20Signal%20of%20Firm%20Quality.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Tadelis (2001) - The Market For Reputations As An Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001)]], "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf]
 
−
#[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
 

Latest revision as of 19:11, 15 June 2011

  • This page is in the BPP category
  • This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
Insert the following code at the head of each page in this section:
*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]

NOTE: This is for 2011. For 2010, see 2010 BPP Field Exam Papers.

Innovation (Mowery)

See also: BPP Innovation

  1. S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc
  2. P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.
  3. Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
  4. Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
  5. Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
  6. Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
  7. Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
  8. Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
  9. Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
  10. Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf

Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)

Dal Bo

  1. Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. pdf (Class Slides)
  2. Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. pdf
  3. Salop (1979), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. pdf
  4. Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. pdf

Tadelis

See notes on Steve's innovation section here.

  1. Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999), "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 pdf
  2. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  3. Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572
  4. Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. pdf
  5. Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. pdf
  6. Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. pdf
  7. Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. pdf
  8. Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008), "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. pdf
  9. Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990), "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. pdf
  10. Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,” NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])

de Figueiredo

  1. Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series", Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. pdf
  2. Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. pdf
  3. Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. pdf
  4. Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000), "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. pdf
  5. Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity. Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403.
  6. Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q", Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. pdf
  7. Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount", Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. pdf
  8. Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. pdf
  9. Teece, D. (1982), "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. pdf

Institutions

See also: ECON224

Tadelis

See Notes from Steve's institution section here.

Yuchtman

For the Papers below, see summaries here.

  • Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
  • Manning (2003)
  • Lazear (2000)
  • Bandiera et al (2007)

Polictical Science

Dal Bo

  1. Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf (Slides #9)
  2. Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf (Slides #6)
  3. Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf (Slides #8)
  4. Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf (Slides #6)
  5. Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf (Slides #4)
  6. Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf (Slides #7)
  7. Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf (Slides #9)
  8. Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf (Slides #7)
  9. Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf (Slides #2)
  10. Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf (Slides #6)

Slide Sets referenced are:

  • Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Slides #2)
  • Externalities in voting games (Slides #4)
  • The efficiency of democracy (Slides #6)
  • Competition and influence (Slides #7)
  • Corruption deterrence (Slides #8)
  • The electoral control of politicians (Slides #9)

de Figueiredo

See also: BPP Political Science

  1. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
  2. Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf (Class Handout and Class Slides)
  3. Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
  4. Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
  5. Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
  6. de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
  7. de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
  8. Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
  9. Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
  10. Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
  11. Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, available on his website pdf (Class Slides: Set1 Set2, © Adrienne Hosek)

Auctions and Contracts

See PHDBA279B.

Morgan

  1. Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. link pdf
  2. Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. link pdf
  3. Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003), "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. link pdf
  4. Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf
  5. Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf
  6. Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press pdf
  7. Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. link pdf
  8. Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, link pdf
  9. Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. link pdf

The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:

Tadelis

  1. Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000), "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. pdf
  2. Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 pdf
  3. Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009), "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. pdf
  4. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf
  5. Goldberg, Victor P. (1977), "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 pdf
  6. Holmstrom B., (1999), "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 pdf
  7. Kreps, D. (1990), "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through Google Books)
  8. Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008), "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. pdf
  9. Tadelis, S. (2001), "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 pdf
  10. Williamson, Oliver E. (1971), "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. pdf
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