Difference between revisions of "PTLR Codification"

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Created from: http://mcnair.bakerinstitute.org/wiki/Patent_Thicket_Literature_Review
+
This page is a part of the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] paper
 +
 
 +
Webcrawler Wiki: [[PTLR Webcrawler]]
  
 
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=
 
=The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules=
Line 7: Line 9:
 
==Core Terms==
 
==Core Terms==
  
−
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces = (SIS)'''
+
'''Saturated  Invention Spaces - (SIS)'''
 
  As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)
 
  As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)
 
    
 
    
 
  '''Example of:'''   
 
  '''Example of:'''   
−
  ''imperfect competition - (IC)''
+
  ''imperfect competition''
 
  '''Look for:'''
 
  '''Look for:'''
−
  ''cluster - (CLSTR)''
+
  ''cluster''
−
  ''coherent groups - (CoGs)''
+
  ''coherent groups''
−
  ''adjacent - (Adj)''
+
  ''adjacent''
 +
''saturated''
 +
''substitutes''
 +
''complements''
 +
''free-ride''
 +
''invent around''
 +
''imperfect competition''
 +
''substitutes''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006'''
  
−
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)'''
+
'''Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI)'''
 
  1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)   
 
  1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)   
 
   
 
   
 
  '''Example of:'''
 
  '''Example of:'''
−
  ''coordination - (COOR)''
+
  ''lack of coordination of licensing prices''
 
  '''Look for:'''
 
  '''Look for:'''
−
  ''diversely-held - (DH)''
+
  ''diversely-held''
−
  ''complementary inputs - (CI)''
+
  ''complementary inputs''
−
  ''dispersed - (DIS)''
+
''multiple inputs''
−
  ''fragmented - (Frag)''
+
  ''dispersed''
−
  ''Cournot problem - (CP)''
+
''anticommons''
−
  ''multiple marginalization - (MM)''
+
''tragedy of the anticommons''
 +
  ''fragmented''
 +
  ''Cournot problem''
 +
  ''multiple marginalization''
 +
''FRAND''
 +
''patent pools''
 +
''licensing''
 +
''cross-licensing''
 +
''license''
 +
''standard setting''
 +
''SSO''
 +
''royalty stacking''
 +
''multilateral arrangements''
 +
''bilateral arrangements''
 +
''individual arrangements''
 +
''invent around''
 +
''Mexican Standoff''
 +
''Coasian''
 +
'''Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley & Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969'''
  
 
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''
 
'''Overlapping Patents - (OP)'''
−
  Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.
+
  Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.
−
  Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP
+
  Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.
 
   
 
   
 
  '''Example of:'''
 
  '''Example of:'''
−
  ''Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)'''
+
  ''Imperfectly defined property rights'''
 
  '''Look for:'''
 
  '''Look for:'''
−
  ''patent overlap - (PO)''
+
  ''patent overlap''
−
  ''overlapping claims - (OC)''
+
''overlap''
−
  ''similar claims - (SC)''
+
  ''overlapping claims''
−
  ''simultaneous infringement - (SI)''
+
  ''similar claims''
 +
  ''simultaneous infringement''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Burk & Lemley 2003, Regibeau & Rockett 2011'''
  
 
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''
 
'''Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)'''
Line 46: Line 76:
 
   
 
   
 
  '''Example of:'''
 
  '''Example of:'''
−
  ''Moral Hazard - (MH)''
+
  ''Moral Hazard''
 
  '''Look for:'''
 
  '''Look for:'''
−
  ''spurious patents - (SP)''
+
  ''spurious patents''
 
  ''dubious''
 
  ''dubious''
 
  ''bad''
 
  ''bad''
Line 56: Line 86:
 
  ''rent-seeking''
 
  ''rent-seeking''
 
  ''bad faith''
 
  ''bad faith''
 +
''submarines''
 +
''ever-greening''
 +
''hidden action''
 +
''Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld & Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe & Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004'''
  
 
==Modern Terms==
 
==Modern Terms==
Line 62: Line 97:
 
   
 
   
 
  '''Look for:'''
 
  '''Look for:'''
−
''search costs''
 
 
  ''prosecution costs''
 
  ''prosecution costs''
−
  ''perverse incentive''
+
  ''court fees''
 
  ''bargaining costs''
 
  ''bargaining costs''
 
  ''coordinating costs''
 
  ''coordinating costs''
 
  ''maintenance fees''
 
  ''maintenance fees''
−
  ''Leahy- Smith America Invents Act''
+
  ''licensing fees''
 
  ''Coasian''
 
  ''Coasian''
 +
''Coase''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn & MacGarvie 2009/2011'''
  
 
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''
 
'''Probabilistic Patents - (PP)'''
 +
Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents. 
 +
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''imperfectly defined property rights''
 +
''probabilistic''
 +
''uncertain''
 +
''infringement''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Lemley & Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003'''
 +
 +
'''Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx)'''
 +
Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.
 +
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''ever-greening''
 +
''submarine patents''
 +
''viagra''
 +
''expected returns''
 +
''commercialization opportunities''
 +
''spurious patents''
 +
''gaming the patent system''
 +
''patent portfolios''
 +
''stand-alone commercial value''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob'''
 +
 +
'''Search Costs - (SC)'''
 +
All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.
 +
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''transaction costs''
 +
''fees''
 +
''Coase''
 +
''Coasian''
 +
''Leahy-Smith''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn & MacGarvie 2011'''
 +
 +
'''Patent Hold-up - (PH)'''
 +
The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.
 +
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''hold-up''
 +
''Williamson's''
 +
''FRAND''
 +
''SEP''
 +
''license fee''
 +
''guile''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC'''
 +
 +
'''Strategic Patents - (SP)'''
 +
Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.
 +
 +
'''Look for'''
 +
''accumulating patents''
 +
''patent portfolio''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Hall & Ziedonis'''
 +
 +
'''Hold-out - (HO)'''
 +
Can occur in situations of DHCI when a "hold-out" player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.
 +
*Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.
 +
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''hold-out''
 +
''multilateral bargaining''
 +
''non-participating''
 +
'''Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009'''
 +
 +
'''Additional Terms found by Dylan'''
 +
 +
'''Look for:
 +
''patent strategies''
 +
''IP rights thicket''
 +
''patent thicket''
 +
''TRIPS''
 +
''Diffusion of Innovation''
 +
''overlapping ownership''
 +
''multiple overlapping granted patent rights''
 +
''non-practicing entity''
 +
''patent pile-up''
 +
''cross license''
 +
''patent pool''
 +
''follow-on inventions''
 +
''complimentary input''
 +
''anti-commons''
 +
''Cournot problem''
 +
''simultaneous infringment''
 +
''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''
 +
''Mexican Standoff''
 +
''standardization''
 +
''game theory''
 +
''battle of the sexes''
 +
''hand-cuffing''
 +
''build-and-let-build''
 +
''modern standards''
 +
''technical standards''
 +
''international standards''
 +
''exclusively licensed''
 +
 +
=Types=
 +
 +
'''Theory - (T)'''
 +
 +
'''Empirical - (E)'''
 +
 +
'''Discussion - (D)'''
 +
 +
=Topics=
 +
 +
'''Effects on Academia - (EA)'''
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''cumulative innovation''
 +
''basic science''
 +
''research''
 +
''development''
 +
 +
'''Private Mechanism - (PM)'''
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''cross-licensing''
 +
''patent pools''
 +
''patent clearinghouses''
 +
''patent collectives''
 +
''FRAND''
 +
''patent intermediaries''
 +
''NPEs''
 +
''technology standards''
 +
''standard setting organizations''
 +
''patent clearinghouses''
 +
 +
'''Industry Commentary - (IC)'''
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''nanotech industry''
 +
''genetics industry''
 +
''basic science''
 +
''upstream patents''
 +
''nanobiotech''
 +
''synthetic biology''
 +
 +
'''IPR Reform - (IPR)'''
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''property rights''
 +
''USPTO''
 +
''propertization''
 +
''IP rights''
 +
''patent pools''
 +
''Leahy-Smith America Invents Act''
 +
 +
'''Firm Strategy - (FS)'''
 +
'''Look for:'''
 +
''market entry''
 +
''compete''
 +
''invent around''
 +
''infringement''
 +
''blocking''
 +
''secrecy''
 +
''ever-greening''
 +
''Mexican Standoff''
 +
''patent troll''
 +
''saturated invention space''
 +
 +
=Publication Type=
 +
 +
'''Econ - (ECON)'''
 +
'''Law - (LAW)'''
 +
'''Science - (SCI)'''
 +
'''Policy Report - (POLR)'''
 +
 +
=Authors=
 +
 +
''What are the number of authors? (0-9)''
 +
''How many authors are repeat authors?''
 +
 +
=Individual Terms=
 +
 +
'''Code for:'''
 +
''cross-licensing''
 +
''patent pools''
 +
''patent clearinghouses''
 +
''patent collectives''
 +
''FRAND / RAND''
 +
''patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)''
 +
''NPEs Non-Participating Entities''
 +
''technology standards''
 +
''SSOs (standard setting organizations)''
 +
''patent trolls''
 +
''submarine patents''
 +
''SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)''
 +
''ever-greening''
 +
''blocking''
 +
''cites: Shapiro (2001), "Navigating the patent thicket"''
 +
''cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), "Anti-commons something..."''
 +
''cites: Heller (1997?), "Something..."''
 +
 +
 +
[[Category:Internal]]

Latest revision as of 10:57, 4 April 2018

This page is a part of the Patent Thicket Literature Review paper

Webcrawler Wiki: PTLR Webcrawler

The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules

This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them. See below:

Core Terms

Saturated Invention Spaces - (SIS) 

As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15)
 
Example of:  
imperfect competition
Look for:
cluster
coherent groups
adjacent
saturated
substitutes
complements
free-ride
invent around
imperfect competition
substitutes
Frequent Author(s): Teece 1998, Somaya 2003, Hemphill 2003, Hussinger 2006

Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs - (DHCI) 

1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro,  pg.17)  

Example of:
lack of coordination of licensing prices
Look for:
diversely-held
complementary inputs
multiple inputs
dispersed
anticommons
tragedy of the anticommons
fragmented
Cournot problem
multiple marginalization
FRAND
patent pools
licensing
cross-licensing
license
standard setting
SSO
royalty stacking
multilateral arrangements
bilateral arrangements
individual arrangements
invent around
Mexican Standoff
Coasian
Frequent Authors(s): Shapiro 2001, Heller 1997, Heller and Eisenberg 1998, Lemley & Shapiro 2006, Arrow 1973, Mossoff 2009, Lemley 2008, Cheung 1969

Overlapping Patents - (OP) 

Second most common foundation of a thicket.  Patents can overlap vertically or horizontally. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights.
Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in vertical overlap.

Example of:
Imperfectly defined property rights'
Look for:
patent overlap
overlap
overlapping claims
similar claims
simultaneous infringement
Frequent Author(s): Burk & Lemley 2003, Regibeau & Rockett 2011

Gaming the Patent System - (GPS) 

Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents.  Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors.

Example of:
Moral Hazard
Look for:
spurious patents
dubious
bad
likely invalid
junk
impeding genuine innovators
rent-seeking
bad faith
submarines
ever-greening
hidden action
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics
Frequent Author(s): Marshall 1976, Holstrom 1979, Hegde et al. 2009, Rubinfeld & Maness 2004, Jacob 2009, Jaffe & Lerner 2004, Schmalensee 2009, Attaran 2004

Modern Terms

Transaction Costs - (TC) 

All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance.  Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms.

Look for:
prosecution costs
court fees
bargaining costs
coordinating costs
maintenance fees
licensing fees
Coasian
Coase
Frequent Author(s): Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn & MacGarvie 2009/2011

Probabilistic Patents - (PP) 

Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art.  Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation.  They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents.  

Look for:
imperfectly defined property rights
probabilistic
uncertain
infringement
Frequent Author(s): Lemley & Shapiro 2005/2006, Bessen 2003

Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx) 

Patents issued for reason/utility unknown.  Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value.

Look for:
ever-greening
submarine patents
viagra
expected returns
commercialization opportunities
spurious patents
gaming the patent system
patent portfolios
stand-alone commercial value
Frequent Author(s): Kiley, Jacob

Search Costs - (SC) 

All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty.  This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities.

Look for:
transaction costs
fees
Coase
Coasian
Leahy-Smith
Frequent Author(s): Wang 2010, Lemley Shapiro 2006, Callaway 2008, Farrell 2009, Cockburn & MacGarvie 2011

Patent Hold-up - (PH) 

The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology.  Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower.  This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee.

Look for:
hold-up
Williamson's
FRAND
SEP
license fee
guile
Frequent Author(s): Lemley, Shapiro, Farrell, Langus, Epstein, Williamson, Hayes, Sullivan, FTC

Strategic Patents - (SP) 

Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom.  In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value.  Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs.

Look for
accumulating patents
patent portfolio
Frequent Author(s): Hall & Ziedonis

Hold-out - (HO) 

Can occur in situations of DHCI when a "hold-out" player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties.  The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned.
*Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners.

Look for:
hold-out
multilateral bargaining
non-participating
Frequent Author(s): Farrell 2009

Additional Terms found by Dylan 

Look for:
patent strategies
IP rights thicket
patent thicket
TRIPS
Diffusion of Innovation
overlapping ownership
multiple overlapping granted patent rights
non-practicing entity
patent pile-up
cross license
patent pool
follow-on inventions
complimentary input
anti-commons
Cournot problem
simultaneous infringment
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
Mexican Standoff
standardization
game theory
battle of the sexes
hand-cuffing
build-and-let-build
modern standards
technical standards
international standards
exclusively licensed

Types

Theory - (T)

Empirical - (E)

Discussion - (D)

Topics

Effects on Academia - (EA) 

Look for:
cumulative innovation
basic science
research
development

Private Mechanism - (PM) 

Look for:
cross-licensing
patent pools
patent clearinghouses
patent collectives
FRAND
patent intermediaries
NPEs
technology standards
standard setting organizations
patent clearinghouses

Industry Commentary - (IC) 

Look for:
nanotech industry
genetics industry
basic science
upstream patents
nanobiotech
synthetic biology

IPR Reform - (IPR) 

Look for:
property rights
USPTO
propertization
IP rights
patent pools
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act

Firm Strategy - (FS) 

Look for:
market entry
compete
invent around
infringement
blocking
secrecy
ever-greening
Mexican Standoff
patent troll
saturated invention space

Publication Type

Econ - (ECON)
Law - (LAW)
Science - (SCI)
Policy Report - (POLR)

Authors

What are the number of authors? (0-9)
How many authors are repeat authors?

Individual Terms

Code for:
cross-licensing
patent pools
patent clearinghouses
patent collectives
FRAND / RAND
patent intermediaries (include auctions, brokers, etc.)
NPEs Non-Participating Entities
technology standards
SSOs (standard setting organizations)
patent trolls
submarine patents
SEPs (Standard Essential Patents)
ever-greening
blocking
cites: Shapiro (2001), "Navigating the patent thicket"
cites: Heller and Eisenberg (1998?), "Anti-commons something..."
cites: Heller (1997?), "Something..."
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