Edit Article: Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules

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*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]] *This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page ==Reference== *Merges, Robert P (1996), "Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations", Cal L. Rev., Vol.84, pp.1293 @article{merges1996contracting, title={Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations}, author={Merges, Robert P}, journal={Cal L. Rev.}, volume={84}, pages={1293}, year={1996}, abstract={As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this, litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of statutory compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of "liability rulesh" in the foundational legal entitlements framework of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. They appear to be a compromise: they address the mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic advantages that accompany strengthened rights. In this Article, Professor Merges argues that proposals to create more compulsory licenses are rooted in a faulty theoretical framework. Based on a survey of the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property transactions, Merges contends that "repeat players" (individuals and firms that frequently need to exchange rights) can and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks. Whether through copyright collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI in the music industry, or undertakings such as patent pools in automobile and aircraft manufacturing, those with a recurring need to transact in intellectual property rights invest in administrative structures that lower the costs of exchanging rights. Among other functions, these collective rights organizations promulgate rules and procedures for placing a monetary value on members' property rights. They thus conserve on transaction costs either by making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining, versus more costly one-shot exchanges. Drawing on a body of academic literature known as the new institutional economics, Professor Merges explains and analyzes the origins and operation of these organizations. He also argues that entitlement theory must be adjusted to recognize the possibility that such institutions will evolve out of a background of strong property rights. More generally, he points out that entitlement theory ought to incorporate a more dynamic understanding of the importance of contracting after entitlements are granted. Professor Merges applies his observations and theoretical insights to an important contemporary controversy: whether Congress ought to legislate a compulsory license for digital content needed by the multimedia industry. He argues that it should not. Given the underlying economics, and consistent with experience in other industries, existing intellectual property rights will force industry participants to invest in institutions to conduct transactions. Indeed, consistent with the analysis in this Article, evidence indicates this is already occurring}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory, Discussion}, industry={All}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this, litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of statutory compulsory licensing.}, thicket_def={#A-T, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism}, thicket_def_extract={This Article is aimed at providing conceptual guidance for those who need to traverse the new thicket of intellectual property rights (IPRs).' Each vine, each plant, standing in one's path represents a distinct IPR owned by an individual. To pass through, one needs a license from each owner. Where a single right blocks the path, this is easy: a single licensing contract does the trick. Today, however, business people more often than not encounter a tangled, twisted mass of IPRs, which criss-cross the established walkways of commerce. Progress along this path does not come cheaply; rather, it requires numerous contracts with multiple, independent right holders}, tags={Seminal Theory!, First Thicket Metaphor, Copyright, Patents}, filename={Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules.pdf} } ==File(s)== *[[Media:Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules.pdf|Download the PDF]] *[[:Image:Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules.pdf|Repository record]] ==Abstract== As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this, litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts, especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of statutory compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of "liability rulesh" in the foundational legal entitlements framework of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed. They appear to be a compromise: they address the mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic advantages that accompany strengthened rights. In this Article, Professor Merges argues that proposals to create more compulsory licenses are rooted in a faulty theoretical framework. Based on a survey of the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle intellectual property transactions, Merges contends that "repeat players" (individuals and firms that frequently need to exchange rights) can and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks. Whether through copyright collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI in the music industry, or undertakings such as patent pools in automobile and aircraft manufacturing, those with a recurring need to transact in intellectual property rights invest in administrative structures that lower the costs of exchanging rights. Among other functions, these collective rights organizations promulgate rules and procedures for placing a monetary value on members' property rights. They thus conserve on transaction costs either by making it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion for repeat-play, reciprocal bargaining, versus more costly one-shot exchanges. Drawing on a body of academic literature known as the new institutional economics, Professor Merges explains and analyzes the origins and operation of these organizations. He also argues that entitlement theory must be adjusted to recognize the possibility that such institutions will evolve out of a background of strong property rights. More generally, he points out that entitlement theory ought to incorporate a more dynamic understanding of the importance of contracting after entitlements are granted. Professor Merges applies his observations and theoretical insights to an important contemporary controversy: whether Congress ought to legislate a compulsory license for digital content needed by the multimedia industry. He argues that it should not. Given the underlying economics, and consistent with experience in other industries, existing intellectual property rights will force industry participants to invest in institutions to conduct transactions. Indeed, consistent with the analysis in this Article, evidence indicates this is already occurring

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