View source for Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities

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==Model Setup==
2011 2nd Year exam paper question.
* Players: Legislators, vote buyers A and B. 
* Choice space: <math>(x,s)\in R</math>. 
* Preferences: Legislators: <math>u_{i}=u_{i}(x)-u_{i}(s)</math>
* Game form: A first, b second. Bribe upon commitment to vote. 
* Information: Complete/perfect. 
* EQM: SPNE, Pure strategies, tie rule: Vote for last offer. 
* Because lobbyists are worried about competitors invading coalitions, it is sometimes cheaper to bribe a large majority, possibly including the entire legislature. 

Rui's points:
* Sequence matters, 
* More than minimum winning coalition
* First mover advantage and 2nd mover advantage. 
* "The proofs are horrendous, you don't need to know those."