View source for PHDBA602 (Theory of the Firm)

PHDBA602 is a (for credit) Directed Studies course, that doctoral students can use to develop their own courses with a professor. This page provides information about a directed study course with Steve Tadelis on that centers arounds models that provide theories of the firm.

==Format==

The format is:
*One, perhaps two, models per class
*One class per week, with a timeslot TBD.
*The student will write up the model ahead of time (on this wiki)
*The class will be used to:
**Discuss intricacies of the model
**Discuss modelling choices, with a view to helping the student understand how to build models
**Place the model in the context of the broader literature

==Papers==

===General Overviews===
*Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf] [[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |(stub)]]
*Holmstrom, Bengt R. and Jean Tirole (1989), "Chapter 2 The theory of the firm", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 61-133. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Tirole%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%202%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm pdf]

===Background Literature===
*Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf] [[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |(stub)]]
*Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] [[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |(stub)]]

===Transaction Cost Economics===
*Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf] [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |(stub)]]
*[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]], "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]], "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]], "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]
*[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]], "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]

===Property Rights Model===
*Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf] [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |(stub)]]
*Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6, Dec., pp. 1119-1158 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1990)%20-%20Property%20Rights%20and%20the%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf] [[Hart Moore (1990) - Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm|(stub)]]

===Multi-tasking===
*Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] [[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |(stub)]]

===Centralization/Decentralization:===
*[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
*[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]

===Relational Contracting:===
*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations| Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (1999)]] "Informal authority in organizations", Journal of law, economics, & organization, volume 15, issue 1, page 56 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20In%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
*[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (2002) - Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm | Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy (2002)]], "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm", The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 117, issue 1, page 39 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(2002)%20-%20Relational%20Contracts%20And%20The%20Theory%20Of%20The%20Firm.pdf pdf]

===Firm Boundaries:===
*[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]
*[[Holmstrom (1999) - The Firm As A Subeconomy| Holmstrom, Bengt (1999)]], "The Firm As A Subeconomy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 74-102. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Firm%20As%20A%20Subeconomy.pdf pdf]

===Adaptation===
*[[Dessein Santos (2006) - Adaptive Organizations |Dessein, Wouter and Tano Santos (2006)]], "Adaptive Organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 5, DOI: 10.1086/508031 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20Santos%20(2006)%20-%20Adaptive%20Organizations pdf]
*[[Bajari Tadelis (2001) - Incentives versus Transaction Costs A Theory of Procurement Contracts| Bajari, Patrick and Steven Tadelis (2001)]], "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 387-407 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bajari%20Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20Incentives%20versus%20Transaction%20Costs%20A%20Theory%20of%20Procurement%20Contracts pdf]