ECON224 Field Exam Papers

• This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam

The following papers were selected for study for ECON224 'Institutions' by Egan and Hernandezlisted in the order that they appeared in class (marked Included if they were included by the Shelef, Thompson, et al. peer group):

• (I) North, Douglass (1991). "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives pdf
• Williamson, Oliver (2000), "New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal of Economic Literature pdf
• (I) Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 pdf
• (I) Williamson, Oliver, (1983), "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 pdf
• (I) Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 pdf
• (I) Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 pdf
• (I) Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. pdf
• (I) Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 233-261. pdf
• Gibbons, Robert (2004), "Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?" (September 16). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-34. pdf
• (I) Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. pdf
• (I) Whinston (2003), "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 pdf
• (I) Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982), "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 pdf
• (I) Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. pdf
• (I) Garicano, Luis (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. pdf
• Lafontaine, Francine and Kathryn L. Shaw (1999), "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 1041-1080. (Optional Reading) pdf
• (I) Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. pdf
• Anderson, Erin (1988), "Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces," Management Science, 34 (May), 599-618. pdf
• (I) Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. pdf
• Gibbons, R. (1998), "Incentives in Organizations.", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 115-32 (especially pp. 115-23). pdf
• Prendergast. C. (1999), "The Provision of Incentives in Firms.", Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63 pdf
• Spiller, Pablo (1990), "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. pdf
• (I) Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. pdf
• (I) Prendergast, Canice (2003), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. pdf
• (I) McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. pdf
• (I) Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. pdf
• Williamson, Oliver E. (1976), "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 73-104. pdf
• (I) Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. pdf
• (I) Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. pdf
• (I) McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. pdf
• De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999), "An informational perspective on administrative procedures", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. pdf

The following additional papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:

• (I) Garicano, Luis (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. pdf
• (I) Weingast and Marshall (1988), "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. pdf

They also added (perhaps wisely):

• Spiller, Pablo (2008), "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 pdf