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Reinganum (1989) - The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion (view source)
Revision as of 18:15, 29 September 2020
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{{Article
|Has page=Reinganum (1989) - The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=The Timing Of Innovation Research Development And Diffusion
|Has author=Reinganum
|Has year=1989
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
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*This page is referenced in [[PHDBA602 (Innovation Models)]]
==Reference(s)==
*Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1989), "Chapter 14 The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion", In: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, Editor(s), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Volume 1, Pages 849-908. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Reinganum%20(1989)%20-%20Chapter%2014%20The%20Timing%20Of%20Innovation%20Research%20Development%20And%20Diffusion.pdf (pdf)]
@article{reinganum1989timing,
title={The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion},
author={Reinganum, Jennifer F},
journal={Handbook of industrial organization},
volume={1},
pages={849--908},
year={1989},
publisher={Amsterdam: North Holland}
}
==Abstract==
There are some basic assumptions that underlie all of the symmetric models:
*Firms are '''Firms are homogeneous''', and so we look for symmetric solutions
*'''Innovation is costly''', with costs (eventually at least) decreasing and convex (i.e. there are eventual diseconomies of scale)
*'''The first to invent wins''' the rights to a rent (i.e. gets a patent) and everyone else gets nothing (i.e. no spillovers)
The symmetric models section proceeds as follows:
#Simple '''first price or all pay auction ''' set-ups are discussed#'''Dasguspta and Stiglitz (1980) ''' gives a first price auction like game, but with a continously discounted prize and bids translate into times to invention.#'''Kamien and Schwatz (1976) ''' describe the partial equilibrium of a patent race with stochastic invention#'''[[Loury (1979) - Market Structure And Innovation |Loury (1979)]] give ''' gives the full equilibrium result #'''[[Lee,Wilde (1980) - Market Structure And Innovation A Reformulation |Lee and Wilde (1980)]] ''' extend Loury by considering the payment of cost to occur continously as continous until an invention occurs, rather than solely at the outset#'''Reinganum (1982) ''' gives an even more general model, which allows for variable rates of investment over time (and so full strategic responses to rival's investment), and also considers imperfect patent protection.
