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*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Merges, Robert P (1999), "Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools", University of California at Berkeley Working Paper
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999},
abstract={In this Chapter I hope to accomplish three things: briefly summarize trends in the economic theory of intellectual property rights (IPRs); describe some ideas of my own on the emergence of IPR exchange institutions, and describe how an emphasis on institutions fits into existing theory; and ground these issues in a discussion of collective IPR licensing, in particular, patent pools. I begin with a discussion of how transactions have crept into IP theory, and then turn to an examination of actual institutions that have evolved out of the need for various industries to conduct a large volume of IPR transactions.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={High-tech},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Pools},
filename={Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
In this Chapter I hope to accomplish three things: briefly summarize trends in the economic theory of intellectual property rights (IPRs); describe some ideas of my own on the emergence of IPR exchange institutions, and describe how an emphasis on institutions fits into existing theory; and ground these issues in a discussion of collective IPR licensing, in particular, patent pools. I begin with a discussion of how transactions have crept into IP theory, and then turn to an examination of actual institutions that have evolved out of the need for various industries to conduct a large volume of IPR transactions.
Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions (view source)
Revision as of 16:33, 18 March 2013
, 16:33, 18 March 2013no edit summary
*This page is referenced in the [[Patent Thicket Literature Review]]
*This page is listed on the [[PTLR Core Papers]] page
==Reference==
*Merges, Robert P (1999), "Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools", University of California at Berkeley Working Paper
@article{merges1999institutions,
title={Institutions for intellectual property transactions: the case of patent pools},
author={Merges, Robert P},
journal={University of California at Berkeley Working Paper},
year={1999},
abstract={In this Chapter I hope to accomplish three things: briefly summarize trends in the economic theory of intellectual property rights (IPRs); describe some ideas of my own on the emergence of IPR exchange institutions, and describe how an emphasis on institutions fits into existing theory; and ground these issues in a discussion of collective IPR licensing, in particular, patent pools. I begin with a discussion of how transactions have crept into IP theory, and then turn to an examination of actual institutions that have evolved out of the need for various industries to conduct a large volume of IPR transactions.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={High-tech},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Pools},
filename={Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf}
}
==File(s)==
*[[Media:Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf|Download the PDF]]
*[[:Image:Merges (1999) - Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions.pdf|Repository record]]
==Abstract==
In this Chapter I hope to accomplish three things: briefly summarize trends in the economic theory of intellectual property rights (IPRs); describe some ideas of my own on the emergence of IPR exchange institutions, and describe how an emphasis on institutions fits into existing theory; and ground these issues in a discussion of collective IPR licensing, in particular, patent pools. I begin with a discussion of how transactions have crept into IP theory, and then turn to an examination of actual institutions that have evolved out of the need for various industries to conduct a large volume of IPR transactions.
