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Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases (view source)
Revision as of 13:33, 16 May 2012
, 13:33, 16 May 2012New page: Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012 Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median ...
Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]
Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority.
Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy.
===Research Question===
Do super majority requirements have effect of lowering tax rate across states?
*if super majorities adopted where majority is pro-tax, then we might measure confounding effects.
**higher tax-rate from majority party being pro-tax
**lower tax rate from super majority.
===Results===
Both fixed effects (state/year) and IV(variation in state constitutional amendment rules) regressions show that super-majorities requirements significantly reduce tax-rate.
Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority.
Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy.
===Research Question===
Do super majority requirements have effect of lowering tax rate across states?
*if super majorities adopted where majority is pro-tax, then we might measure confounding effects.
**higher tax-rate from majority party being pro-tax
**lower tax rate from super majority.
===Results===
Both fixed effects (state/year) and IV(variation in state constitutional amendment rules) regressions show that super-majorities requirements significantly reduce tax-rate.
