Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model (view source)
Revision as of 15:37, 12 June 2011
, 15:37, 12 June 2011→Model
* The players in the model are citizens and a competitive supply of politicians.
* All live indefinitely.
* All voters are ideologically homogenous and can coordinate to discipline the executive. All voters can essentially be treated as a single coherent actor.
* There are elections in every period.
* Citizen's utility is equal to <math>1-x</math>
# Politician is elected.
# Voter commits to reelection rule.
# Politician chooses <math>x\in[0,1]</math>.
# Voter decides whether to reelect or not according to rule.
<b>Paper's question</b>: What's the optimal voting rule?
Notice: If the voters fire iff <math>x>0<math>, all politicians will choose <math>x=1</math> forever and gets voted out the next round. If voters never fire, politician always takes everything.
