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Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control (view source)
Revision as of 18:16, 16 September 2011
, 18:16, 16 September 2011New page: Note similarity to Baron and Ferejohn (1989): * Multi-lateral, * Bargaining * Divide the "pie" (not the dollar) * Non-cooperative * Use of stationary equilibrium * Divisibility and trans...
Note similarity to Baron and Ferejohn (1989):
* Multi-lateral,
* Bargaining
* Divide the "pie" (not the dollar)
* Non-cooperative
* Use of stationary equilibrium
* Divisibility and transferability of benefits.
Looks at cases where B<T (benefits less than costs).
Programs are characterized by B, T (total benefits and total taxes). P (programs) are characterized by <math>B/T, P\in[0,\inf]</math>.
* <math>B: \{b|b_{i}>0, i=1,2,3,...,n, \sum b_{i}\leq B}
* T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>.
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>.
* Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)<\math>. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.
* Multi-lateral,
* Bargaining
* Divide the "pie" (not the dollar)
* Non-cooperative
* Use of stationary equilibrium
* Divisibility and transferability of benefits.
Looks at cases where B<T (benefits less than costs).
Programs are characterized by B, T (total benefits and total taxes). P (programs) are characterized by <math>B/T, P\in[0,\inf]</math>.
* <math>B: \{b|b_{i}>0, i=1,2,3,...,n, \sum b_{i}\leq B}
* T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>.
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>.
* Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)<\math>. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.
