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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 16:25, 23 October 2009
, 16:25, 23 October 2009→Vote Recruitment in Client Politics
Legislators have ideal points: <math>z \backsim U[-\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2}]</math>
, with the median legislator's ideal point denoted <math>z_m</math>.
The utility function of legislators is additively-seperable with a term representing their constituent's preferences and a term for the resources provided to them by the client:
<math> U(w,z)=-\alpha(w-z)+r_w, \alpha>0</math> where <math>\alpha</math> represents the intensity of preferences. The Interest seeks <math>x > 0, x \ge y, A=\{x,y}</math> where x is the policy, y is the status quo and A is the agenda.<math></math>