|Has page=Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Why Are Stabilizations Delayed
|Has author=Alesina Drazen
|Has year=1991
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
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}}
*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]
[http://www.edegan.com/repository/Rui%20Notes%20on%20Alsina%20and%20Drazen.pdf Rui's Notes From Class]
==Reference(s)==
==The Model==
Until <math>t=0\,</math> the budget is balanced, with debt . At <math>b_0 \ge t=0\,</math>. At a shock hits reducing tax revenues, which implies with debt <math>t=b \ge 0\,</math> a shock hits reducing tax revenues. After <math>t=0\,</math> until stabilization, <math>(1-\gamma)\,</math> of government expenditure including interest payments is covered by issuing debt, and <math>\gamma\,</math> is covered by distortionary taxation, where <math>\gamma >0\,</math> but not fixed.
Denoting <math>g_0\,</math> as the level of expenditure, debt <math>b(t)\,</math> evolves according to:
<math>\underbrace{\frac{db}{dt}}_{\mbox{Change in debt}} = \overbrace{(1-\gamma)}^{\mbox{deficit}}\times\underbrace{[rb(t) + g_0]}_{\mbox{Total government spending}}\,</math>
:<math>\therefore \tau(t) = \gamma r \bar{b}^{(1-\gamma)rt}\,</math>
*With further shocks lead to one side immediately conceding following a shock
*Be extended to show that more political resources are needed as the war progresses
*Be interpretted interpreted as follows: <math>\theta\,</math> is the existance of institutions that make it relatively more difficult for opposing groups to stop reform
Note that reform does not necessarily directly follow a shock!