PHDBA279A Field Exam Papers

• This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam

The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):

Part 1 - Dal Bo

Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez:

• Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
• Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 pdf
• Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. pdf
• Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
• Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
• Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
• Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
• Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
• Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
• Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
• Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf

Short list by Dal Bo:

• Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
• Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
• (3) Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
• (3) Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
• (3) Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
• (2) Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
• (2) Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
• Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
• (1) Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf
• (1) Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf

Note - Emphasis placed on (1) Control of Politicians, (2) Competition and influence, and (3) Efficiency of Democracy.

Part 2 - de Figueiredo

Selected papers:

• Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
• Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
• Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
• Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
• Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
• Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
• Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
• Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
• Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf