PTLR Codification
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
The Patent Thicket Literature Review Coding Rules
This collection of terms, definitions, key words have been organized and assigned shorthand codes to identify them. See below:
Core Terms
Saturated Invention Spaces = (SIS)
As first defined by Teece: when a single firm, or a small number of firms, successfully patents an entire technological area. (p.15) Example of: imperfect competition - (IC) Look for: cluster - (CLSTR) coherent groups - (CoGs) adjacent - (Adj)
Diversely-held Complimentary Inputs = (DHCI)
1) products require complementary patented inputs; 2) these inputs are diversely-held (i.e. held by N patent-holders); and 3) patent-holders set their license prices independently. (Shapiro, pg.17) Example of: coordination - (COOR) Look for: diversely-held - (DH) complementary inputs - (CI) dispersed - (DIS) fragmented - (Frag) Cournot problem - (CP) multiple marginalization - (MM)
Overlapping Patents - (OP)
Second most common foundation of a thicket. Vertical overlap is largely adjacent. Horizontal likely due to poorly defined rights. Refinement patents and research tool patents can result in OP Example of: Imperfectly defined property rights - (IDPR)' Look for: patent overlap - (PO) overlapping claims - (OC) similar claims - (SC) simultaneous infringement - (SI)
Gaming the Patent System - (GPS)
Patent applicants partake in inappropriate action - such as applying for obvious or non-novel patents. Puts undue burden on the patent office and crates neg. externalities, such as imposing additional costs on genuine inventors. Example of: Moral Hazard - (MH) Look for: spurious patents - (SP) dubious bad likely invalid junk impeding genuine innovators rent-seeking bad faith
Modern Terms
Transaction Costs - (TC)
All fees associated with patenting: applications, prosecution costs, renewal maintenance. Should de-incentivize low value patents, but may also de-incentivize invention by small firms. Look for: prosecution costs perverse incentive bargaining costs coordinating costs maintenance fees Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Coasian
Probabilistic Patents - (PP)
Patents are inherently probabilistic b/c they do not guarantee monopoly rights over new art. Rather patents suggest a greater likelihood to prevail in court should there be litigation. They cannot provide perfect protection from infringement or obstruct the filing of invalid patents. Look for: Bessen Lemley & Shapiro information asymmetry uncertainty invalid patents infringement invent around
Unspecified / Extended Use - (UnEx):
Patents issued for reason/utility unknown. Also applies to patents issued for discreet, inventive steps that do not have stand-alone commercial value. Look for: Kiley ever-greening Jacob submarine patents viagra expected returns commercialization opportunities spurious patents gaming the patent system patent portfolios stand-alone commercial value
Search Costs - (SC)
All costs associated with finding preexisting patents to avoid infringement and verify novelty. This is particularly expensive for smaller firms lacking robust search capabilities. Look for: Wang Coasian' perverse incentives willful infringement
Patent Hold-up - (PH):
The patentees ability to extract higher license fees after the infringer has sunk costs implementing the patented technology. Had the infringer sought licensing prior to utilization, license fees are assumed to be lower. This is the opposite of reverse patent hold-up, which is when the infringer uses the invention and waits to get sued whilst presuming that litigation will be slow, uncertain, and costly for the patentee. Look for: Epstein Farrell Williamson's rents royalties reverse hold-up guile FRAND SEP Langus
Strategic Patents - (SP):
Often used to describe accumulating many patents merely to control design freedom. In this case, patents are commonly used as bargaining chips rather than reflecting intrinsic value. Largely welfare neutral, however it can contribute to transaction and search costs. Look for: patent portfolio Hall & Ziedonis
Hold-out - (HO);
Can occur in situations of DHCI when a "hold-out" player resists participating in a multilateral agreement across different parties. The nonparticipating hold-out player takes advantage of their position to extract higher rents from licensees because self-interest and social welfare are not aligned. *Reverse patent hold-up is sometimes called “hold-out” by legal practitioners. Look for: guile FRAND SEP Farrell patent hold-up reverse patent hold-up DHCI
Types
Theory - (T):
Economic theory papers are largely concerned with the DHCI problem.
Empirical - (E):
Papers that drift towards first including overlapping patents along with DHCI, and then begin abandoning the usage of DCHI.
Discussion - (D):
It seems that economists favor DHCI and overlaps, cite Shapiro (2001) and do more theoretical work; whereas legal scholars favor overlaps, cite Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and provide discussion.'
