PTLR Up Group Processed BibTeX

  journal={Hastings Bus. LJ},
  volume={4},
  pages={135},
  year={2008},
  publisher={HeinOnline},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={},
  industry={Semiconductor},
  thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={The proliferation of the 555 by other companies illustrates the cutthroat nature of the semiconductor industry in its infancy. But today, more than ever, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals to enter cross-licensing agreements.},
  thicket_def={See Shapiro},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={555 Timer, History, Industry example},
  filename={Callaway (2008) - Patent Incentives In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf}
}

@article{carrier2003resolving,
  title={Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation},
  author={Carrier, M.A.},
  journal={Vand. L. Rev.},
  volume={56},
  pages={1047},
  year={2003},
  publisher={HeinOnline},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={Multiple patents read on the product},
  thicket_def_extract={In these cases, activity that encourages such post-patent innovation, such as licensing between the initial inventor and the follow-on innovator, should be encouraged, since the path of innovation might not continue absent such agreement. Collaboration also could resolve "bottlenecks" by which patents block innovation in the same or later generations of products. For example, patent "thickets" in the semiconductor industry are made up of hundreds, if not thousands, of patents that read onto one product. In this setting, cross-licensing agreements and patent pools are necessary to resolve the bottlenecks and should be encouraged.}, 
  tags={Pool, Bottlenecks},
  filename={Carrier (2003) - Resolving The Patent Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation.pdf}
}

@article{carrier2004cabining,
  jstor_articletype = {research-article},
  title = {Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm},
  author = {Carrier, Michael A.},
  journal = {Duke Law Journal},
  jstor_issuetitle = {},
  volume = {54},
  number = {1},
  jstor_formatteddate = {Oct., 2004},
  pages = {pp. 1-145},
  url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040481},
  ISSN = {00127086},
  abstract = {One of the most revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has been the "propertization" of intellectual property (IP). The duration and scope of rights expand without limit, and courts and companies treat IP as absolute property, bereft of any restraints. But astonishingly, scholars have not yet recognized that propertization also can lead to the narrowing of IP. In contrast to much of the literature, which criticizes the propertization of IP, this Article takes it as a given. For the transformation is irreversible, sinking its tentacles further into public and corporate consciousness (as well as the IP laws) with each passing day and precluding the likelihood that IP will return to the prepropertization era. This Article therefore ventures onto a new path, one that follows property into unexpected briar patches of limits. The secret here is that property is not as absolute as it is often claimed to be. After surveying fifty doctrines in property law, Professor Carrier synthesizes limits based on development, necessity, and equity. He then utilizes these limits to construct a new paradigm for IP. The paradigm facilitates the reorganization of defenses that courts currently recognize as well as a more robust set of defenses, which include (1) a new tripartite fair use doctrine in copyright law, (2) a new defense for public health emergencies and a recovered experimental use defense and reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent law, (3) a development-based limit to trademark dilution, and (4) a functional use defense for the right of publicity. By adopting the paradigm of property, IP has reopened the door to limits. Rediscovering these limits offers significant promise for the future of innovation and democracy.},
  language = {English},
  year = {2004},
  publisher = {Duke University School of Law},
  copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Duke University School of Law},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={Overlapping patents},
  thicket_def_extract={In such industries there frequently arises a "patent thicket," in which overlapping patent rights enable each patent holder with a patented input in the product to block the use of the product by all others},  
  tags={Nature of IP, Reverse Doctorine of Equivalents},
  filename={Carrier (2004) - Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm.pdf}
}

@article{chu2009effects,
  jstor_articletype = {research-article},
  title = {Effects of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE Analysis},
  author = {Chu, Angus C.},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
  jstor_issuetitle = {},
  volume = {14},
  number = {1},
  jstor_formatteddate = {Mar., 2009},
  pages = {pp. 55-78},
  url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27750775},
  ISSN = {13814338},
  abstract = {What are the effects of blocking patents on R&D and consumption? This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and capital accumulation to quantitatively evaluate the effects of blocking patents. The analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth that determines the amount of profits created by an invention and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of profits between current and former inventors along the quality ladder. The model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy. Under parameter values that match key features of the US economy and show equilibrium R&D underinvestment, I find that optimizing the profit-sharing rule of blocking patents would lead to a significant increase in R&D, consumption and welfare. Also, the paper derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation.},
  language = {English},
  year = {2009},
  publisher = {Springer},
  copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Springer},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={See Shapiro, Overlaping blocking patents},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={Blocking patents, Profit sharing rules},
  filename={Chu (2009) - Effects Of Blocking Patents On R and D A Quantitative DGE Analysis.pdf}
}

@article{cotter2008patent,
  title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses},
  author={Cotter, T.F.},
  journal={J. Corp. L.},
  volume={34},
  pages={1151},
  year={2008},
  publisher={HeinOnline},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={See Shapiro},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={IPR Reform, Patent Hold-up, Antitrust},
  filename={Cotter (2008) - Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust Responses.pdf}
}

@article{denicolo2007do,
  jstor_articletype = {research-article},
  title = {Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?},
  author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo},
  journal = {Economic Policy},
  jstor_issuetitle = {},
  volume = {22},
  number = {52},
  jstor_formatteddate = {Oct., 2007},
  pages = {pp. 679+681-729},
  url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4502213},
  ISSN = {02664658},
  abstract = {Is the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper reformulates the theoretical analysis of the optimal level of patent protection to take into account the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending and inventions and estimates an elasticity of the supply of inventions of 0.5 or more. Thepaper then assesses the current level of patent protection, exploiting estimates of the private and social returns to R&D taken from the empirical literature and other available sources. Although more research is needed for a more precise assessment, the evidence available suggests that patents do not overcompensate innovators.},
  language = {English},
  year = {2007},
  publisher = {Wiley on behalf of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme},
  copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={Neutral},
  thicket_stance_extract={How serious those problems are is a matter of controversy...},
  thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},
  thicket_def_extract={In certain industries, such as telecommunications and biotechnology, production of new products often requires many complementary innovative components that are owned by different firms. The proliferation and fragmentation of intellectual property rights creates a 'patent thicket' that is often viewed as an obstacle to innovation. Two main problems may emerge. First, a proliferation of patents held by different owners increases transaction costs and might even prevent manufacturers from obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Second, with complementary patents there may be a problem of Cournot complements (Shapiro, 2001) that increases the deadweight loss to profit ratio. }, 
  tags={Complementary Innovations},
  filename={Denicolo (2007) - Do Patents Over Compensate Innovators.pdf}
}

@article{devlin2009indeterminism,
  jstor_articletype = {research-article},
  title = {Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation},
  author = {Devlin, Alan},
  journal = {Yale Law & Policy Review},
  jstor_issuetitle = {},
  volume = {28},
  number = {1},
  jstor_formatteddate = {fall 2009},
  pages = {pp. 61-106},
  url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27871287},
  ISSN = {07408048},
  abstract = {},
  language = {English},
  year = {2009},
  publisher = {Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.},
  copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Patents},
  thicket_def_extract={More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy.}, 
  tags={Comparison of real and intellectual property rights},
  filename={Devlin (2009) - Indeterminism And The Property Patent Equation.pdf}
}

@article{federal2003promote,
  title={To promote innovation: The proper balance of competition and patent law and policy},
  author={Federal Trade Commission},
  journal={Washington, DC},
  year={2003},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Policy Report},
  research_type={},
  industry={All, Semiconductor},
  thicket_stance={Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={Shapiro, Questionable patents},
  thicket_def_extract={This tends to create a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology...   Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. In the context of a patent thicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning. Questionable patents in patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because a manufacturer needs a license to all of the patents that cover its product, firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to threaten litigation...},  
  tags={FTC Report},
  filename={FTC (2003) - To Promote Innovation.pdf}
}

@article{federal2011evolving,
  title={The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning patent notice and remedies with competition.”},
  author={Federal Trade Commission},
  journal={March, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf},
  year={2011},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Policy Report},
  research_type={},
  industry={IT},
  thicket_stance={Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={Shapiro Verbatim},
  thicket_def_extract={Indeed, IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” – densely overlapping patent rights held by multiple patent owners...}, 
  tags={FTC Report},
  filename={FTC (2011) - The Evolving IP Marketplace.pdf}
}

@article{gallini2011private,
  title={Private agreements for coordinating patent rights: the case of patent pools},
  author={Gallini, N.},
  journal={Economia e Politica Industriale},
  year={2011},
  publisher={FrancoAngeli Editore},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={},
  thicket_stance={Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary patents},
  thicket_def_extract={A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to bring a new product or technology to market...},
  tags={Pools},
  filename={Gallini (2011) - Private Agreements For Coordinating Patent Rights.pdf}
}

@article{ganslandt2009intellectual,
  title={Intellectual property rights and competition policy},
  author={Ganslandt, M.},
  year={2009},
  publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={},
  industry={IT, Biotech},
  thicket_stance={},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={See Shapiro},
  thicket_def_extract={In addition, the significant increase in the multiplicity of patents, referred to as “patent thickets” and “patent floods”, are considered by many to impede the ability of firms to conduct R&D activity effectively (Eisenberg 1989; Shapiro 2001)...  A second issue relevant for sequential innovations is so-called “patent thickets”. In some industries, particularly biotechnology and information technologies, it is common that a new entrant, in order to engage in research or production, must obtain a large number of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producers. This problem raises the cost of product commercialization and may create substantial entry barriers for new firms.},  
  tags={IPR Reform, Antitrust},
  filename={Ganslandt (2009) - Intellectual Property Rights And Competition Policy.pdf}
}