Difference between revisions of "Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale"
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|Has page=Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale | |Has page=Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale | ||
| − | |Has title=Protection For Sale | + | |Has bibtex key= |
| + | |Has article title=Protection For Sale | ||
|Has author=Grossman Helpman | |Has author=Grossman Helpman | ||
|Has year=1994 | |Has year=1994 | ||
Latest revision as of 18:14, 29 September 2020
| Article | |
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| Has bibtex key | |
| Has article title | Protection For Sale |
| Has author | Grossman Helpman |
| Has year | 1994 |
| In journal | |
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| In number | |
| Has pages | |
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| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Reference(s)
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
Abstract
We develop a model in which special-interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. The interest groups bid for protection with their campaign support. Politicians maximize their own welfare, which depends on total contributions collected and on the welfare of voters. We study the structure of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium and the contributions by different lobbies that support the policy outcome. We also discuss why the lobbies may in some cases prefer to have the government use trade policy to transfer income, rather than more efficient means.
