Difference between revisions of "Brander Egan Hellmann (2010) - Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital"
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+ | {{Article | ||
+ | |Has page=Brander Egan Hellmann (2010) - Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital | ||
+ | |Has bibtex key= | ||
+ | |Has article title=Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital | ||
+ | |Has author=Brander Egan Hellmann | ||
+ | |Has year=2010 | ||
+ | |In journal= | ||
+ | |In volume= | ||
+ | |In number= | ||
+ | |Has pages= | ||
+ | |Has publisher= | ||
+ | }} | ||
+ | {| class="wikitable floatright" cellpadding="2" | ||
+ | |+ '''With the editors, at the NBER Pre-Conference''' | ||
+ | |- border="0" | ||
+ | ! width="260" | [[Image:Ed and Antoinette - HorizCut.jpg|250px]] | ||
+ | ! width="260" | [[Image:Ed and Josh - HorizCut.jpg|250px]] | ||
+ | |- align="center" | ||
+ | | Antoinette Schoar & Me || Me & Josh Lerner | ||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
==Reference== | ==Reference== | ||
Brander, James A., Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann (2010), "Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence", in "International Differences In Entrepreneurship", J. Lerner and A. Schoar, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. | Brander, James A., Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann (2010), "Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence", in "International Differences In Entrepreneurship", J. Lerner and A. Schoar, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. | ||
+ | |||
+ | @article{brander2010government, | ||
+ | title={Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence}, | ||
+ | author={Brander, James A. and Egan, Edward J. and Hellmann, Thomas F.}, | ||
+ | journal={"International Differences In Entrepreneurship", J. Lerner and A. Schoar, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.}, | ||
+ | year={2010}, | ||
+ | publisher={National Bureau of Economic Research} | ||
+ | } | ||
==File(s)== | ==File(s)== | ||
*[[Media:Brander_Egan_Hellmann_(2010)_-_Government_Sponsored_versus_Private_Venture_Capital.pdf|Download the PDF]] | *[[Media:Brander_Egan_Hellmann_(2010)_-_Government_Sponsored_versus_Private_Venture_Capital.pdf|Download the PDF]] | ||
− | *[[Image:Brander_Egan_Hellmann_(2010)_-_Government_Sponsored_versus_Private_Venture_Capital.pdf|Repository record]] | + | *[[:Image:Brander_Egan_Hellmann_(2010)_-_Government_Sponsored_versus_Private_Venture_Capital.pdf|Repository record]] |
+ | |||
+ | ==Status== | ||
+ | |||
+ | *This paper is published in an NBER book ("International Differences In Entrepreneurship", edited by J. Lerner and A. Schoar). | ||
+ | *This paper was presented at: The NBER pre-conference on International Differences in Entrepreneurship, Boston, Massachusetts (May ‘07) | ||
+ | *Google Scholar listed 50 cites as of Oct 2013. | ||
==Abstract== | ==Abstract== | ||
This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market. | This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market. |
Latest revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
Article | |
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Has bibtex key | |
Has article title | Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital |
Has author | Brander Egan Hellmann |
Has year | 2010 |
In journal | |
In volume | |
In number | |
Has pages | |
Has publisher | |
© edegan.com, 2016 |
Antoinette Schoar & Me | Me & Josh Lerner |
Contents
Reference
Brander, James A., Edward J. Egan, and Thomas F. Hellmann (2010), "Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence", in "International Differences In Entrepreneurship", J. Lerner and A. Schoar, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
@article{brander2010government, title={Government Sponsored versus Private Venture Capital: Canadian Evidence}, author={Brander, James A. and Egan, Edward J. and Hellmann, Thomas F.}, journal={"International Differences In Entrepreneurship", J. Lerner and A. Schoar, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.}, year={2010}, publisher={National Bureau of Economic Research} }
File(s)
Status
- This paper is published in an NBER book ("International Differences In Entrepreneurship", edited by J. Lerner and A. Schoar).
- This paper was presented at: The NBER pre-conference on International Differences in Entrepreneurship, Boston, Massachusetts (May ‘07)
- Google Scholar listed 50 cites as of Oct 2013.
Abstract
This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market.