Difference between revisions of "Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers"
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{{Article | {{Article | ||
|Has page=Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers | |Has page=Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers | ||
| − | |Has title=Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers | + | |Has bibtex key= |
| + | |Has article title=Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers | ||
|Has author=Becker Stigler | |Has author=Becker Stigler | ||
|Has year=1974 | |Has year=1974 | ||
Latest revision as of 18:14, 29 September 2020
| Article | |
|---|---|
| Has bibtex key | |
| Has article title | Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |
| Has author | Becker Stigler |
| Has year | 1974 |
| In journal | |
| In volume | |
| In number | |
| Has pages | |
| Has publisher | |
| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Reference(s)
Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
Abstract
No abstract available at this time
Topic and Basic ideas
A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is [math]b[/math] and the probability of being caught is [math]p[/math].
Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. Note that this can be costly, but recouped by using entrance fees.
