Difference between revisions of "LaPorta LopezDeSilanes Shleifer Vishny (1998) - Law And Finance"
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|Has page=LaPorta LopezDeSilanes Shleifer Vishny (1998) - Law And Finance | |Has page=LaPorta LopezDeSilanes Shleifer Vishny (1998) - Law And Finance | ||
|Has title=Law And Finance | |Has title=Law And Finance | ||
| − | |Has author= | + | |Has author=LaPorta LopezDeSilanes Shleifer Vishny |
|Has year=1998 | |Has year=1998 | ||
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Revision as of 12:23, 29 September 2020
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| Has author | LaPorta LopezDeSilanes Shleifer Vishny |
| Has year | 1998 |
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Reference(s)
- La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1998), "Law and Finance", Journal of Political Economy, CIV, 1113-1155 pdf
Abstract
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and Frenchcivil- law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
