Difference between revisions of "Baker Hubbard (2003) - Make Vs Buy In Trucking"
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Revision as of 12:22, 29 September 2020
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| Has author | Baker Hubbard |
| Has year | 2003 |
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Reference(s)
Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. pdf
Abstract
Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 influenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We find that OBCs' incentive-improving features pushed hauls toward private carriage, but their re- source-allocation-improving features pushed them toward for-hire carriage. We con- clude that ownership patterns in trucking reflect the importance of both incomplete contracts and of job design and measurement issues.
