Difference between revisions of "Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases"
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Article | {{Article | ||
| − | |Has page= | + | |Has page=Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases |
|Has title= | |Has title= | ||
|Has author= | |Has author= | ||
Revision as of 12:06, 29 September 2020
| Article | |
|---|---|
| Has bibtex key | |
| Has article title | |
| Has year | |
| In journal | |
| In volume | |
| In number | |
| Has pages | |
| Has publisher | |
| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
- Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority.
Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy.
Research Question
Do super majority requirements have effect of lowering tax rate across states?
- if super majorities adopted where majority is pro-tax, then we might measure confounding effects.
- higher tax-rate from majority party being pro-tax
- lower tax rate from super majority.
Results
Both fixed effects (state/year) and IV(variation in state constitutional amendment rules) regressions show that super-majorities requirements significantly reduce tax-rate.
