Difference between revisions of "Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities"
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Model Setup
2011 2nd Year exam paper question.
- Players: Legislators, vote buyers A and B.
- Choice space: [math](x,s)\in R[/math].
- Preferences: Legislators: [math]u_{i}=u_{i}(x)-u_{i}(s)[/math]
- Game form: A first, b second. Bribe upon commitment to vote.
- Information: Complete/perfect.
- EQM: SPNE, Pure strategies, tie rule: Vote for last offer.
- Because lobbyists are worried about competitors invading coalitions, it is sometimes cheaper to bribe a large majority, possibly including the entire legislature.
Rui's points:
- Sequence matters,
- More than minimum winning coalition
- First mover advantage and 2nd mover advantage.
- "The proofs are horrendous, you don't need to know those."
