Difference between revisions of "Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models"
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==Model== | ==Model== | ||
| − | Consider a two-dimensional case. | + | Consider a two-dimensional case. Any policy <math>z_{i}<math> is characterized by coordinates (x_i, y_i) |
==Result== | ==Result== | ||
| − | In first stage we vote on | + | In first stage we vote on <math>x_{i}<math> and obtain policy equal to median voters bliss point x_m. In second stage we vote on y_i and obtain policy equal to median voters bliss point y_m, so we obtain unique outcome z=(x_m, y_m) |
| + | T is always distributed equally among n districts so <math>t_{i}=T/n</math>. | ||
Revision as of 13:22, 14 May 2012
Paper's Motivation
McKelvey's Chaos Thm: In a multidimensional spacial settings, unless points are distributed in a rare way (like radially symmetric), there is no Condorcet winner, and whoever controls the order of voting can make any point the final outcome.
In response, the author considers voting on one 'attribute' or dimension at a time.
Model
Consider a two-dimensional case. Any policy [math]z_{i}\lt math\gt is characterized by coordinates (x_i, y_i) ==Result== In first stage we vote on \lt math\gt x_{i}\lt math\gt and obtain policy equal to median voters bliss point x_m. In second stage we vote on y_i and obtain policy equal to median voters bliss point y_m, so we obtain unique outcome z=(x_m, y_m) T is always distributed equally among n districts so \lt math\gt t_{i}=T/n[/math].
