Difference between revisions of "Katz (1986) - An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development"
imported>Ed (New page: ==Reference(s)== Katz, Michael L. (1986), "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 527-543 [http://www.edegan.com/...) |
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Katz, Michael L. (1986), "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 527-543 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Katz%20(1986)%20-%20An%20Analysis%20of%20Cooperative%20Research%20and%20Development.pdf pdf] | Katz, Michael L. (1986), "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 527-543 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Katz%20(1986)%20-%20An%20Analysis%20of%20Cooperative%20Research%20and%20Development.pdf pdf] | ||
Revision as of 22:47, 22 November 2010
- This page is referenced in PHDBA602 (Innovation Models)
Reference(s)
Katz, Michael L. (1986), "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 527-543 pdf
Abstract
I analyze the effects of cooperative research, whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it. In this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low, when there are R&D spillovers in the absence of cooperation, when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible, and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities. I show that a royalty-free cross-licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of R&D through sharing.
