Farrell (2009) - Intellectual Property As A Bargaining Environment

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Reference

• Farrell, Joseph (2009), "Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment", Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol.9, No.1, pp.pp. 39-53

@article{farrell2009intellectual,
  title = {Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment},
  author = {Farrell, Joseph},
  journal = {Innovation Policy and the Economy},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {pp. 39-53},
  abstract = {Executive Summary Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the shadow of exclusivity. But bargaining is generically less than fully efficient, and the bargaining that would be needed to reach efficient arrangements in the shadow of exclusivity may be especially difficult in certain ways. I explore these issues and illustrate with brief discussions of patent pools and standards organizations, among others.},
  year = {2009},
  publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
  copyright = {Copyright (c) 2009 The National Bureau of Economic Research},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={Discussion},
  industry={General},
  tags={SSO, Patent Pools, Cross-licensing},
  filename={Farrell (2009) - Intellectual Property As A Bargaining Environment.pdf}
}

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Abstract

Executive Summary Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the shadow of exclusivity. But bargaining is generically less than fully efficient, and the bargaining that would be needed to reach efficient arrangements in the shadow of exclusivity may be especially difficult in certain ways. I explore these issues and illustrate with brief discussions of patent pools and standards organizations, among others.