Difference between revisions of "Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control"

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Revision as of 02:10, 13 October 2011

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Note similarity to Baron and Ferejohn (1989):

  • Multi-lateral,
  • Bargaining
  • Divide the "pie" (not the dollar)
  • Non-cooperative
  • Use of stationary equilibrium
  • Divisibility and transferability of benefits.

Looks at cases where B<T (benefits less than costs).

Programs are characterized by B, T (total benefits and total taxes). P (programs) are characterized by [math]B/T, P\in[0,\inf][/math].

  • [math]B: \{b|b_{i}\gt 0, i=1,2,3,...,n, \sum b_{i}\leq B\}[/math]
  • T is always distributed equally among n districts so [math]t_{i}=T/n[/math].
  • Proposals are fully characterized by [math]b\in B[/math] and net benefits are [math]z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n[/math].
  • Payoffs are discounted: [math]\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)[/math]. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.

Stationarity implies members are paid their continuation value in equilibrium in exchange for their votes. [math]\delta v(g,t), \forall t\in\Tau[/math]

Proposition 1: With closed rule the stationary EQM has the following properties:

  • (i) Inefficient pork barrel programs will be adopted. Inefficiency is increasing in [math]n[/math]
  • (ii) Possible set of programs is increasing in [math]\delta[/math].
  • (iiii) coalitions are minimum winning.
  • (iv) There is proposal power.
  • (v) 1st proposal is always selected.


Derivation of proposition 1:

  • [math]z_{i}\gt \delta\bar{V}[/math]. [math] b_{i}-T/n\geq\bar{V} \implies b_{i}\geq T/n+\delta\bar{V}[/math].
  • Proposal will be accepted if [math](n-1)/2[/math] members vote yes, therefore proposals will be of the form of: Keep [math]B-\frac{n-1}{2}(\frac{T}{n+\delta\bar{V}}[/math]. Give [math]T/n +\delta\bar{V}\lt /math to \lt math\gt (n-1)/2[/math] others, and the rest zero.
  • [math]\bar{V}[/math]=P(selected)E[Value of being selected|p^{\ast})+P(not selected)(value of not being selected).
  • [math]\bar{V}=\frac{1}{n}(B-\frac{n-1}{2}(T/n+\delta\bar{V}))+\frac{n-1}{n}(\frac{1}{2}(T/n+\delta\bar{V}) +\frac{1}{2}(-T/n))[/math]. Solve for [math]\bar{V}=\frac{B-T}{n}[/math].
  • Offer is [math]T/n+\frac{\delta(B-T)}{n}=\frac{\delta B-(1-\delta)T}{n}[/math].

... unfinished. Sorry.

Open rule:

  • Never get universalism w/ inefficient program.
  • Inefficent program minimum winning coalition (MWC).
  • Amendments shift power to voters with inefficiency.
  • Set of proposals which are adopted is smaller.