Difference between revisions of "Cabral Hortacsu (2008) - Dynamics Of Seller Reputation"
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imported>Ed (New page: ==Reference(s)== Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics [http://www.edegan.com/pd...) |
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==Abstract== | ==Abstract== | ||
| − | We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the impor- tance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We | + | We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the impor- tance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We find that, when a seller �rst receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the �rst one and don't have nearly as much impact as the first one. We also �nd that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average. |
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| + | Keywords: quality, reputation, auctions, eBay. | ||
Revision as of 22:15, 4 April 2010
Reference(s)
Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics pdf
Abstract
We construct a panel of eBay seller histories and examine the impor- tance of eBay's reputation mechanism. We find that, when a seller �rst receives negative feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8%; subsequent negative feedback ratings arrive 25% more rapidly than the �rst one and don't have nearly as much impact as the first one. We also �nd that a seller is more likely to exit the lower his reputation is; and that, just before exiting, sellers receive more negative feedback than their lifetime average.
Keywords: quality, reputation, auctions, eBay.
